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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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**President Evren Comments on Armenian Claims**  
46050030b Istanbul JAMANAk in Armenian  
26 Jun 87 p 1

[Article: "President Evren Reflects on the Armenian Question in His Speech in Elazig: 'Inasmuch as the Gyumri Agreement Has Been Signed With the Armenians, It Is Difficult to Comprehend the Rekindling of This Resolved Issue'"]

[Text] President of the Republic Kenan Evren voiced a reminder in a speech given in Elazig that Turkey had voluntarily joined NATO and had backed its actions, but that unfortunately we have seen nothing in return from our friends.

President Evren, stressing that the Turkish nation has adopted democracy, stated: "Democracy has been interrupted periodically, but no blood was shed when a military regime came into or went out of power."

Addressing the response to what he had said about NATO, Evren stated: "I am cognizant of what I am saying. I do not favor emotional speechmaking before a crowd; everything I say is weighed before it is stated."

The President also stated that he had noticed signboards in many places, bearing the message "Let he who does not like you die," and commented: "I am disturbed by these signboards. I ask you not to make such evil demands. Let live both he who likes me and he who does not: to demand the opposite is not right."

Evren also addressed the Armenian Question, stating: "At the end of World War I a revolution took place in Russia. After that the Armenians, influenced by the Russians, attacked us. Subsequently a Turkish army under the command of Kiazim Karabekir occupied Kars and Arpashai on 24 September 1920, as an outcome of the Sarikamish war. The signing of the Gyumri Agreement with the Armenians nullified the Treaty of Sevres. Today there is an Armenian Republic in the Soviet Union. We entered into the Treaty of Kars with the Soviet Union on 13 October 1921. This means that this question has been settled. It is very difficult to comprehend the meaning behind digging up this question again. The European Parliament is sending resolutions on this question to the U.S. Congress. They also sent one dealing with Cyprus. Some legislators do not even know where Cyprus is located."

President Evren has returned to Ankara and will receive a visit from King Husayn of Jordan today.

**Former Diplomat on Armenian Question**  
46050030a Istanbul JAMANAk in Armenian  
1 Jul 87 pp 1, 4

[Excerpts from article by Aydin Gungor Alacakaptan: "What Should Be Done Against Armenian Attacks?"]

[Text] Former senior diplomat Aydin Gungor Alacakaptan has written an extensive article which appears in today's issue of *Cumhuriyet* under the above title. We present to our readers several excerpts from this article containing rather useful commentary.

**We Have Scarcely Had Convincing Efforts**

Up until 1981, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commenced a serious investigation of the matter, with arguments brought forth both by American historians and Turkish diplomats, all involved in discussion and study of this issue were under the influence of Armenian preachings.

Even at that time, when a number of our diplomats were trying to respond in their own way to Armenian claims appearing in the foreign press, they were often subjected to censure. And even a diplomat holding a high position could see legitimate aspects to the Armenian claims, since what he knew about the question was limited to a few childhood memories.

Acquaintance abroad with this issue from a Turkish point of view was left to a few people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is gratifying to note that a number of able scholars such as professors Atay, Soysal, and Akci, were able through their own personal sacrifices to assist the cause of the Foreign Ministry. Except for these few individuals, other ranking scholars at Turkish universities, aside from publishing a few brief papers and frequent addresses, have done nothing.

On the other hand, like their colleagues abroad, our delegates who have a responsibility to debate this issue, compromise in lieu of doing their job; instead of using Turkish to refute and debate, they use foreign languages, an old and familiar phenomenon.

In addition, just like our newly-formulated Turkish position against Armenian claims and demands, it is my view that our assessments and works condemning Armenian terrorism, which has been occurring since 1975, fail to be convincing and are unsatisfactory.

For quite some time now Greek Cypriot circles as well as Greece itself have been pointed to as a source of this movement. In the 1980's this view has changed, and Palestinian organizations in the Middle East as well as certain of the general political positions of our Western comrades-in-arms have been pointed to as elements aggravating the situation.



The fact that the Armenian terrorist movement unleashed against our country has been dormant now for a couple of years and the fact that diplomatic attacks launched in its place have been discontinued can be explained as follows: Western states, having felt international terrorism directed against themselves as well, have applied certain means to combat it, and this has exerted influence on the terrorist movement.

3024

**Istanbul Patriarch Rejects EP Resolution**  
46050030c Istanbul JAMANAk in Armenian  
26 Jun 87 p 1

[Article: "'The Decision of the European Parliament Is Wrong; They Have Proclaimed From Abroad on Behalf of the Turkish Armenians,' Says Holy Patriarch"]

[Text] We read the following in today's Milliyet:

Representatives of Turkey's minorities have greeted with adverse reaction those clauses in the Armenian Resolution passed by the European Parliament which claim religious, linguistic, and cultural freedoms are subjected to suppression by the Turkish Government.

Armenian Patriarch His Excellency Archbishop Kalusdian has strongly stated that the Resolution passed by the European Parliament is contrary to the interests of Turkey and of Turkish Armenians.

Archbishop Kalusdian, emphasizing that the Armenians living in Turkey are full and equal citizens of the Republic of Turkey and possess total freedom of religion and religious worship, stated the following: "The Resolution of the European Parliament is wrong and has no application to Turkish Armenians. It was proclaimed from abroad on behalf of the Turkish Armenians."

Rabbi David (Aseo) of the Jewish community also categorized as "unfounded" the clause in the European Parliament resolution which states that freedom of religion and freedom of religious worship on the part of minorities is being suppressed.

3024

**ASALA Allegedly Infiltrated by Turkish Intelligence**  
46050024b Istanbul JAMANAk in Armenian  
13 Jun 87 p 1

[Article: "Mossad Helps Turkish Intelligence Organization Penetrate ASALA"]

[Text] The weekly newspaper NOKTA contained an article in this week's issue on the activities of Israel's secret intelligence organization, the Mossad, stating that it collaborates on a regular basis with a number of

intelligence organizations of other governments, particularly the American CIA, as well as Turkey's TNIO [Turkish National Intelligence Organization].

The newspaper provides extensive information on the incident involving Israeli Consul (Eli Rom) in Istanbul, the Entebbe assault, the synagogue killing, as well as other incidents.

The following will inform our readers on current connections with ASALA.

Editor.

**Nokta Interview With Ufuk Kultemir**

[Question] In your book Kanat Operasconu, published in 1985, you state that during Ozal's visit to America a group of Jews met with him and stated that although Turkey cannot openly establish relations with Israel due to Turkey's existing relations with the Arab countries, the two countries can cooperate in military and intelligence matters, in exchange for which the U.S. Jewish lobby pledged to use its influence in Congress on Turkey's behalf. If Turkey at that time did not accept this proposal, do you believe that there is a possibility that at the present time, with separatist movements growing day by day in the southwestern region, that these organizations will establish closer contacts with one another in order to obtain valuable intelligence information?

[Answer] I believe that such a relationship already secretly exists with the United States. The fact is that the United States passes on to Turkey some of the intelligence information and assessments it receives from Israel. When we met with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Bird in Washington in 1984, he stated that Turkey and the United States are actively cooperating in antiterrorist activities. At that same time Turkey was having difficulties with obtaining accurate intelligence about ASALA activities. This situation was changed, however, by intelligence passing from the Mossad to Turkey via antiterrorist collaboration between the United States and Turkey. It was precisely due to this that Turkish intelligence was able to infiltrate ASALA groups in Beirut. A number of disagreements existing within ASALA escalated into open clashes.

The interview continues with a number of conclusions pertaining to the assault on the synagogue.

3024

**Turkey Protests Against Release Of 'Armenian Terrorist'**  
46050024a Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian  
6 Jun 87 pp 1,4

[Article: "Turkey Protests Release of Harutyun Levonian"]

[Text] As we reported yesterday, the Yugoslav Government has decided to release Harutyun Levonian, one of the two terrorists who assassinated Galip Balkar, Turkish ambassador to Belgrade, and who were sentenced to

life imprisonment by a Yugoslav court. A news release issued in Athens by the Central Committee for Assistance to Armenian Political Prisoners states that Harutyun Levonian was released through the efforts of Armenian clergyman Harutyun Helvajian, but failed to give details on the conditions of the release. It has been reported in some circles that Levonian was released for humanitarian reasons alone, as he was wounded by Yugoslav police during the 1984 assassination of Galip Balkar and subsequently became partially paralyzed. Inasmuch as it was determined that he could not receive proper treatment in Yugoslavia, that his health was gradually deteriorating and that he would eventually die, the decision was made to release him so that he could obtain treatment abroad.

Turkish authorities have lodged a protest with the Yugoslav Government in connection with this release.

The Yugoslav Government officially stated that the release was for humanitarian reasons as described above and denied allegations that Harutyun Levonian was released in exchange for the life of a Yugoslav hostage being held by an Armenian terrorist organization.

As we know, on 9 March 1983 Harutyun Levonian and Raffi Elbekian, members of the Justice Commandos of Armenian Genocide, executed an armed assault on Ambassador Galip Balkar's automobile, killing Balkar and wounding his chauffeur. A Yugoslav police officer who happened to be at the scene exchanged fire with the Armenian terrorists. The policeman wounded Harutyun Levonian, but Raffi Elbekian got away. He was soon taken into custody, however.

3024

## REGIONAL

### Study Reports Broadcasting War Between Arabs, Israel

45040014 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
17 Oct 87 p 49

[Article by Yusuf al-Qa'id]

[Text] What does the Arabic-language radio of the Israeli enemy say? What are the goals of the Israeli enemy in the verbal political battles and air-wave diplomacy? What content does Radio Israel try to present to the ordinary Arab citizen, whether in the occupied Palestinian territories or in the surrounding Arab states that this radio can reach?

Najla Fu'ad Hasan al-'Umari, teaching assistant in the Communications Faculty of Cairo University, has presented her master's thesis on all these and other questions. The thesis, entitled "Propaganda in the Overseas Arabic-Language Broadcasting of Radio Israel," is an analytical study of news broadcasts and programs.

The study describes and defines the central interests of Israeli radio propaganda directed to the Arabs, as these appear in news broadcasts and programs presented by the overseas Arabic-language service of Voice of Israel radio. It studies the methods of influence and persuasion used and the manner in which the resources of radio broadcasting are exploited to communicate a propagandistic logic on various issues to the targeted Arab listener.

The importance of the study comes from the fact that the habit of listening to foreign broadcasts is widespread in the Arab homeland. In Egypt, the percentage of people who listen to foreign stations is 41 percent; in border areas it reaches 60 percent.

Among foreign stations, the Arabic Israeli radio unfortunately has the highest listener ratio in Egypt. In 1983 it reached 28 percent, which is 9 percent above the ratio of Radio Monte Carlo. The highest rate of listening takes place in the Sinai and among Palestinians living in Egypt. Israel therefore takes an interest in this broadcasting: it represents 23 percent of the amount of local broadcasting activity of Voice of Israel radio and 44 percent of the broadcasting activity of Voice of Israel directed at other nations.

The Arab citizen living in Israel is also subjected to this flood, inasmuch as he hears 18 hours of radio and 1.5 hours of television per day. He is inundated with newspapers and magazines in Arabic, while nothing reaches him from the greater Arab homeland. Furthermore, Arabic radio broadcasting directed at Israel from all the Arab states together operates only 10 hours and 15 minutes a day. Whereas we find that Israeli broadcasting

is unified in its goals, principles, and political positions, we find that the Arabic stations are in constant disagreement and that many of them basically concentrate on Arab disagreements.

Those in the Arab homeland who listen to foreign broadcasts do so for two reasons: first, dissatisfaction with the news services offered by domestic broadcasting; second, lack of trust in the material presented.

The present study covers the Israeli enemy's broadcasting in the period from November 1984 to the end of March 1985, i.e., only about 6 months.

Concerning radio ownership in the Arab homeland, the author of the study says that there are about 33 million radio sets, or 184 sets per 1,000 citizens. In Kuwait, the ratio rises to 500 sets per 1,000 citizens; in Lebanon it rises to 517 sets per 1,000 citizens; and in the Sultanate of Oman it reaches 533. In Egypt, however, it drops to 267 sets per 1,000. Arab illiteracy is responsible for the amount of listening to broadcasts; these broadcasts reach 50 percent of the total population, and more than 80 percent in the rural areas that constitute 60 percent of the area of the Arab homeland.

The preferences of Arab citizens in foreign broadcasting take the following form:

- Radio Monte Carlo is first with university students.
- London: second, and the favorite among public personalities and media people.
- Voice of America: third, and first with public authorities.
- Voice of Israel: the fourth station, and the first with public personalities.

However, Saudi radio is the most listened-to [foreign] Arab radio station in Egypt, attracting equal interest from the mass audience and public personalities.

Arabic news takes up 36 percent of Israeli broadcasting, as opposed to 28 percent for news of Israel. This percentage exceeds the interest of Arab national stations in news of the Arab homeland.

On Israeli radio, news of the occupied territories comes first, followed by news of the Arab states and organizations. Jordan comes first because of its connection with the West Bank; then come Algeria and South Yemen (because of interest in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front); then Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Among the Arab organizations, interest begins with the GCC, next the Arab League, and then the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. Among the Arab states: Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and the PLO, with special interest in the Sultanate of Oman and in the Sudan, inasmuch as these two did not cut off relations with Egypt after the treaty. Then come Morocco and Tunisia, followed by Western Europe and America, and then the socialist countries and China. In the occupied territories,

interest is first in the economy, then in the existing differences between the Arab states, with concentration on political differences, then on military ones, and finally on internal conflicts, with a very meager amount of human interest material.

Interest in personalities begins with personalities who live inside the occupied territories (the Arabs of 48), then the personalities of the [West] Bank and [Gaza] Strip. Afterwards come Egyptian personalities, then Lebanese and Jordanian ones and leaders of the PLO, and finally Syrian leaders from a hostile point of view. Personalities are mentioned in the following order: Mubarak, 'Arafat, Husayn, al-Asad. Among deceased personalities there is Anwar al-Sadat.

In the Israeli radio attack on the Arab states, Syria occupies first place, receiving 41 percent of the attack in its role as first and principal antagonist. Then come the Palestinian organizations that dissent from the PLO, which are unqualifiedly attacked. Next come Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states, and then the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, in their role as states of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. After this, the Arabs are attacked without any specification, although the author of the study observed that Israeli radio's attack on the PLO and Yasir 'Arafat is weaker than one might expect when we bear in mind that the PLO is Israel's main enemy. The station defends the Palestinians in the occupied territories, as well as the Egyptian people and leaders.

If Syria is the Arab state most subject to attack, the Lebanese factions and political parties are the Arab factions most subject to attack, while the Egypt-Jordan-PLO axis is weakly defended.

As for the Arab states, in the view of Israeli radio they are fragmented, incapable of agreement, and dominated by rivalry and hostility. They suffer from regional and international isolation and are incapable of confronting Israel. Israel itself, however, appears as an unqualifiedly positive country.

Arab society has only one positive feature in the view of Israeli radio: "the good woman citizen." But she suffers from fragmentation, sectarianism, hunger, poverty, and neglect.

When it comes to problems of the occupied territory, Israeli radio focuses on the idea of co-existence between Palestinians and Jews, along with the representation of Palestinians in various offices and the impact of the economic crisis on Arab conditions.

Regarding Egyptian-Israeli relations, Israeli radio presents only the viewpoints of Israel, Egypt, and the United States, with complete neglect of all the other parties, including the Arab parties and the Egyptian opposition.

Regarding Egyptian-Israeli relations, security matters have been the only area in which cooperation between the two states has appeared as an unqualifiedly positive cooperation.

There has also been a disparaging of the value of opponents to peace in Egypt, who have been described as a small number of intellectuals, merely dissonant voices that have high positions in the media.

As for mention of Mubarak, al-Sadat, and 'Abd-al-Nasir: Mubarak was mentioned 56 times, Anwar al-Sadat 13 times, and Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir 3 times.

This is what Radio Israel does to us: What then are we doing?

That is the question.

12937

## EGYPT

### Aspects Of Housing Crisis Discussed

#### Possible Causes

45040010 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic  
17 Oct 87 pp 37-38

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Tawab: "Inhabitants without Houses...And Houses without Inhabitants"]

[Text] Houses without inhabitants and inhabitants without houses. This was one of the strange ironies which the recent census in Egypt has revealed. This startling irony means that the housing crisis is a "deceptive truth" — it both exists and does not exist. Having worsened, the crisis developed into something similar to the food supply crises. The Egyptian citizen resorts to hoarding apartments and freezing lands just as he habitually hoards food commodities that are in short supply and become rare in the market.

If solving the housing problem requires the building of 3.6 million houses between now and the year 2000, half the number of these houses in fact exist. The Egyptian Central Authority for Mobilization and Census found out that there are 1.8 million unoccupied housing units which their owners have reserved for themselves or for their children who are not yet born or are still in school.

When the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council considered the idea of adopting measures that would open these houses for occupation by imposing taxes on unoccupied apartments — just as in the case of the lands which were left undeveloped by their owners in order to "freeze" them and consequently jack up their prices — President Mubarak asked that, when dealing with this phenomenon, no rash action be taken that would be contrary to the right of private ownership safeguarded by

the constitution. The president asked for an in-depth study of the root causes and effects of this phenomenon without prejudice to the right of the citizen to ensure his children's future.

On the other hand, planning and housing experts demand that the right of private ownership should be viewed within the context of the national and social interest. It is inconceivable that 5 million citizens should be waiting for their turn to obtain a house, in addition to some 2 million citizens living in graveyards, while there are 1.8 million vacant housing units that are not being used. Some people even go as far to say that this phenomenon means that approximately 40 billion pounds in investments are idle and unused. This figure is almost the equivalent of the Egyptian foreign debt.

The experts also say that a large proportion of these housing units are "luxury apartments" whose owners refrained from either finishing or selling them. The excessive building of this type of housing and the exaggeration of their prices has led to a halt in their sale.

The figures also indicate that there are about 300,000 young men and women who are married but are in a state of "suspended marriage" because of the lack of suitable housing. Among these young men and women, 200,000 are in the cities and 100,000 are in rural areas.

How deep-rooted is the problem of the unoccupied apartments, and what are the effects of this perplexing and serious phenomenon? Half of the unoccupied apartments are centered in Cairo, al-Jizah, and Alexandria provinces. The question here is: Why were the owners of this type of apartments compelled to close them? What sort of apartments are these, and which sector is building them? Is it the public sector, the cooperative sector, the foreign investment sector, or the private sector? Or is it all these sectors to varying degrees? Which of these sectors has the lion's share?

The answers to these questions will reveal many mistakes in planning the housing policies, in the system of granting cooperative loans, and in the system of housing distribution that enables a citizen to obtain more than one house. The fault could also lie in the prevalence of investments devoted to housing for the purpose of selling rental units at overpriced costs, particularly since more than 90 percent of the ownerships of the vacant apartments in the cities have not yet been finalized. This means that the final form of ownership has not yet been defined, because the property owners would be waiting to obtain better prices after they exaggerated the costs and specifications of these apartments.

The outlines of the map showing the distribution of these vacant apartments are not yet clear, and so it is premature to seek answers to these questions before the final results of the recent census are known. But the only fact

that we have in hand now—which some people did not believe at first—is that at the time the census was carried out there were 1,792,000 vacant apartments.

Some of the causes of this phenomenon are largely due to the fact that the housing problem has been in existence over the past 30 years. It is also due to the fact that some of the citizens are afraid that their children might suffer what they themselves have suffered [from housing shortage]. This is in addition to the existence of opportunists who obtain subsidized loans and subsidized economy class apartments without needing them. This phenomenon is rife in some of the provincial housing developments and in the building cooperatives, where some people obtain more than one apartment and then sell it with a profit so as to buy yet another one. Thus the game of speculating in land is also being played in apartments and housing units. Such housing units are now found in the quarters of the towns of al-Nasr, al-Ma'adi, and al-Salam town as well as in the new towns of 10 Ramadan, 15 Mayu, and 6 Uktubar. The phenomenon of vacant houses is one of the serious results of the state being forced to accept the legality of building houses which can be sold but not rented.

In related developments, the unbridled open door policy pursued from the mid-seventies to the present is one of the causes of the phenomenon of vacant apartments, because building construction has become a means of trading and speculation in land, estate, and housing. It is also the cause for the emergence of what is known as the housing Mafia, which had the equivalent of a monopoly of the land and housing market and made fantastic profits. Moreover, law provisions that legalize the extension of lease contracts have driven property owners toward preferring selling to renting, since under such contracts the tenant becomes the actual owner of the apartment.

Despite the fact that the Egyptian civil law has organized the contracting of leases, the legislator during this century intervened with emergency legislation that has suspended the general rules of renting. The intervention was for the purpose of dealing with the housing crisis. This provision has led to the property owners refusing to maintain old buildings and to a lack of investments in house construction, as well as the spread of owners selling apartments in order to get rid of the renting restrictions. Moreover there are many obstacles hindering the utilization of bank financing in the housing sector because of the disproportionate interest rate in relation to return from investment and because of the restraint in granting loans.

Meanwhile, in 1978 certain construction companies offered to sell their houses in dollars at \$20,000 apiece by installment. Down payments and the installments were paid based on the dollar being valued at 84 piasters. But the dollar rate increased to 220 piasters and so the installment was multiplied by 2 and a half times. The installment became 2,160 pounds, as opposed to 840



pounds prior to the new rate. The increase of the subsidized interest rate on housing loans from 4 to 14 percent has doubled the burden of owning a house and forced the citizen to refrain from buying houses under these unfair conditions. The bank refrained from giving any easy term loans for housing. The bank's refraining from giving such loans has led to the construction companies refusing to hand over hundreds of housing units that were still under construction or being finished.

In order to come out of this stifling crisis which the housing policy has created, the Ministry of Housing, Construction, and New Communities has begun taking urgent measures, foremost of which are:

- Implementing an urgent housing program focusing on economy and modern middle class houses that achieve cost-saving, provide good quality, and enable efficient utilization of the house.
- Encouraging the construction of houses on top of existing buildings of limited height, provided that their foundations allow it.
- Some of the provinces have actually begun regional housing projects.
- The architectural planning authority is developing new construction areas that would contain about 144,000 feddans, on which some 3.6 million housing units will be built by the year 2000. These projects should be close to utilities networks and should enable easing population density and preserving agricultural land through expansion into the desert. The public and private company sectors will share the implementation of this plan equally.

Will these efforts succeed in redressing the balance between housing and inhabitants in Egypt and rectifying the anomalous situation of having houses without inhabitants and inhabitants without houses?

This is the question that is looking for a positive answer in the present complex Egyptian economic situation.

#### **Government Urged To Take Action**

45040010 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 15 Oct 17 p 2

[Article by Dr Nu'man Jum'ah]

[Text] Obtaining a house is one of the serious problems undermining the foundations of society, a problem which is in need of effective and steady national action. It is a problem that cannot be solved overnight, and delaying tackling it would lead to its increasingly mounting exacerbation. Failing to solve this problem would lead to indirectly serious and even destructive dangers.

This is because those who are deprived of suitable shelter do not get together in a demonstration, march in a procession, or stage a sit-in or a hunger strike. But deprivation of a shelter causes the decay of social values and ethics. A young man who finds it impossible to get married because it is impossible to find a house becomes

vulnerable to all kinds of serious situations, including committing crimes of kidnapping females, extremism, and psychological disturbance which would hamper his energies and capabilities.

Deprivation of suitable housing constitutes a deprivation of minimum human needs. A person deprived of his basic human needs will not possibly adhere to the basic obligations, ethics, and values. The youngster who sleeps in graveyards and in drainage pipes before they are installed or in a small room with his parents and ten of his brothers and sisters will not listen to the advice written on the back of the school book. This youngster will always remain a social time-bomb ready to explode. He is ready to make failure his profession. He carries a switch knife to attack others and to tear bus seats or train seats. He indulges in committing offensive and disgraceful acts and perversions, even if by use of force. He exploits any unpopular unrest in order to come out to the streets with a ball of rags soaked with kerosene to set fire to restaurants, hotels, and places of entertainment.

Last week we tried to advocate the idea that solving the housing problem would come through encouraging those who need housing to solve their problem on their own, either through private or cooperative housing construction, or through the federation of landlords. The state should refrain from building or playing the role of contractor. It should devote all the necessary funds to lending at easy terms. Easy-term-lending is the right way to solve the housing problem in many countries. Acquiring desert land around the cities free of charge, except for the cost of utilities and infrastructure built on this land, should be facilitated. Last week we also dealt with the problem of housing legislation. Following up on this subject, we would say that housing legislation and its implementation by the judiciary has become an extremely complex and intertwined matter. Moreover, such legislation is unjust and frustrating. As a result, it has become impossible for a capitalist to build for the housing of other people and the major cities have become full of unoccupied apartments, either because the owners are afraid to rent them or because of the selfishness of the tenant who obtains more than one low-rent apartment and keeps it as a security for his offspring.

The legislation are extremely biased against property owners. In fact it can be said that the legislation seek to make capital refrain from investment in building and go far in increasing the burdens on property owners. The natural result would be the transfer of such burdens to those who need housing in the form of highly priced apartments or the payment of key money. The other result would be the preference of safety and the capital shunning investment in construction.

Housing legislations impose many administrative restrictions on those who wish to build. An insurance policy directly obtained from an insurance company is not sufficient. This has to go through the bureaucratic

labyrinth. A person applying for a license to build above average houses is compelled to buy housing bonds which in fact are a hidden tax that would increase the burden on the owner who in turn will transfer it to the tenant. He who builds above average housing cannot obtain easy-term loans and so the interest on the loans he obtains reaches 18 percent. Who would then shoulder this interest other than the person who is in need for a house?

Any thinking investor would find it better for him to leave the land without building on it, for its value will increase annually more than it would increase after building on it and renting the housing units. If an investor deposits the cost of building in a bank the return on such money would be greater than the income from the rented building. Who would then be so mad as to build for the purpose of renting?

The state is called upon to take a firm stand so as to revise its policies and legislation in order to begin a new era that is totally different from the present one. We have had enough of hesitation, confusion, and haphazard actions.

13305

## JORDAN

**Egyptian TV Celebrates King Husayn's Birthday**  
44040031a Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic  
16 Nov 87 pp 1,19

[Excerpt] Cairo, Petra—With full accord, the Jordanian family celebrated two days ago the birthday of His Majesty King Husayn. It was joined in the celebration by the sons and daughters of the Arab nation, on whom the king bestowed the dearest and most precious gift a leader can ever present to his subjects—solidarity and a united front.

The Egyptian television represented His Majesty King Husayn as one of the prominent leaders of the Arab movement, especially in this the most crucial stage of our Arab nation's history; through his blameless conduct, his noble character, his unbridled valor in the cause of truth, his zeal in protecting the interests of his people and his Arab nation. His Majesty managed to become a leading figure on the national as well as the Arab levels.

Such was the content of the special program presented by the Egyptian television two days ago on the occasion of His Majesty King Husayn's birthday.

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## LEBANON

**Internal Struggle Within SSNP Threatens Serious Split**

44040014a London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic  
17-23 Oct 87 pp 29-30

[Text] Now that the constitutional institutions are fragmented and their capacity to make political decisions has been crippled, is the objective to fragment the political parties in Lebanon?

Is the sword now laid on the necks of the ideological parties active in Lebanon, parties that by the rigidity of their nationalist attitudes can impede any non-nationalist solution drawn up for Lebanon and the region?

Do the splits, disputes, and liquidations that continue to take place inside the Syrian Social Nationalist Party [SSNP] fall within the framework of this "objective," about which talk is circulating in Lebanon nowadays?

After the martyrdom of its founder and leader Antoine Sa'adah on 8 July 1949 (when Shaykh Bisharah al-Khuri and Riyad al-Sulh carried out the death sentence against him and executed him by firing squad), the SSNP was involved in three internal crises that led to its fragmentation.

The first crisis, in 1956, followed the assassination of 'Adnan al-Maliki in Damascus and led to the departure of George 'Abd-al-Masih from the party, along with some of his supporters. They continued party activity in what came to be known as "the 'Abd-al-Masih clan."

The second crisis was in 1975, when the "general executives" of the party rose against the Supreme Council and the Council of Village Chiefs. They placed in confinement then party president Yusuf al-Ashqar and some of the Supreme Council members and village chiefs who were present at the time in party headquarters. The uprising resulted virtually in a complete split.

While In'am Ra'd was elected president of the legitimate party, the rebels elected Ilyas Jurji Qunayzah as their president. Each claimed constitutional legitimacy and spokespersonship for the Syrian social nationalists in Lebanon and across the border. Cohesiveness returned to the party in 1978, and the Social Nationalists stood armed behind a unified party leadership.

What appeared on the surface to be cohesion, and unification of ranks was actually more internal hatred, turmoil and strife. The wound did not heal, and 'Abdallah Sa'adah's oratorical style was therefore of no avail in inciting the Nationalists to good deeds and to emulating Antoine Sa'adah in settling national accounts. Then came the great explosion; the party entered a new crisis and split apart a third time. This led to armed clashes.

the last of which was in the nationalists' stronghold in al-Kurah (North Lebanon), and to physical liquidations between rivals. Perhaps no antidote will serve to mend the rift this time.

The latest dispute within the SSNP erupted when the Supreme Council (the highest legislative authority within the party) set about removing Party President 'Isam al-Muhayri, who had previously held the rank of secretary, a rank given to distinguished persons and those who have made sacrifices for the party. The decision was taken with a majority of 9 of the 13 members who make up the Supreme Council. The same decision included entrusting the presidency to Secretary Jubran Jurayh, a venerable party member who had been close to Antoine Sa'adah until the latter's death, and the vice-presidency to Dr Marwan Faris.

How did 'Isam al-Muhayri react to the decision taken by the Supreme Council in Beirut?

In the wake of the Supreme Council decision, he held an emergency meeting in his headquarters in the town of Shtawra in the al-Biqa' region of Lebanon and announced a "state of emergency" in the party. According to the party constitution, such a state means the stripping of powers from all party institutions (the Supreme Council, the Council of Village Chiefs, and the Political Bureau) and their placement solely in the hands of the party president. The party president then decided that what had been issued by the Supreme Council was considered void and no longer subject to the constitutional laws required for its implementation.

Again, the Supreme Council reacted by adhering to its decision, considering President 'Isam al-Muhayri's announcement of a "state of emergency" to be a mutiny against the party and its institutions and placing him before the party court with this charge.

These events raised a wave of questions about the destiny of the party, which had continually been able to show itself quite capable of uniting in the face of the crises it had encountered, beginning with 8 July 1949 (the day when Shaykh Bisharah al-Khuri and Riyad al-Sulh carried out the death sentence against its founder, the leader Antoine Sa'adah), and including the first split and the departure of George 'Abd-al-Masih from the party in the wake of the 1956 assassination of 'Adnan al-Maliki in Damascus, the 1961 coup against President Fu'ad Shihab, and finally the uprising by the party general executives early in the Lebanese war. The most persistent question was whether this time the party would successfully overcome the ordeal of a third split.

Those who know the secret machinations by the commissioners of the party's major and minor branches within the highest party institutions, are pessimistic about the possibility of mending the rift and bridging the gap between the Firdan branch in Beirut and the Shtawra branch—in other words, between the Supreme Council

in Beirut and the al-Muhayri clan including its backers and allies in Shtawra. The dispute this time is deeper and the division more powerful than were previous disputes and divisions.

They explain the reasons for their pessimism as follows:

In 1975, when the general executives started their movement by using university students as an avenue, a new party body was formed, called "the Independent Organization," led by Ilyas Jurji Qunayzih, a venerable party member who had been a long-time companion of Antoine Sa'adah. The party was formed in opposition to the main party headed by In'am Ra'd, who was at that time accused by the seceders of having worked to form cells loyal to himself within the ranks of the party.

Returning briefly to that period, we recall that In'am Ra'd's party was a member of the Lebanese National Movement headed by Kamal Junblatt. The Independent Organization, however, became a member of the National Front formed at that time, which included the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party (Syrian wing), the Union of Forces of Working People (the Nasirites), and the Shiite Amal Movement.

After 3 years of efforts, interventions, and compromises, viewpoints were brought together and the dispute abandoned. The party returned to its unity under the presidency of 'Abdallah Sa'adah in 1978.

### A Storm Of Military Rebellion

To a great extent, the party held together after that year: the many signs of difference and conflict generally did not reach the stage of contradictory positions and viewpoints. Instead, a minimum of cohesion continued to exist, until the storm began to blow and threatened to bring the violence that many had tried to avoid and that finally erupted between the fighters and the Supreme Council.

This storm took the form of a 1985 military rebellion in the northern district of al-Matn against the party leadership. It was led by As'ad Hardan and Mufid al-Qintar, two basic supports of the party defense staff. The rebellion was accompanied by acts of violence that caused the death of many victims, including the defense chief himself, Muhammad Salim, who was assassinated by the rebels. (He was known to have been one of the most important leaders of the Lebanese national resistance in the south.)

While there were vigorous rumor campaigns and statements of the sort that asserted that the SSNP had finally split apart and would become two or more parties, there were also vigorous attempts at mediation and efforts by well-meaning people inside and outside the party. They were able to bridle the bloody conflict and set matters right. It seems that the inability of either the party



leadership or the rebels to achieve a decisive settlement of the situation to its own advantage and against the other side contributed to speeding the success of these mediation efforts.

### Quiet Deterioration

But this success has been partial since that time. Although it has prevented bloodshed among members of the one party, it has not been able to heal the wounds or to stop the continued hemorrhaging caused by disputes and divisions. This is what Dr Marwan Faris, vice-president of the new party leadership, said to AL-TADAMUN. In this context, he indicated that since the 1985 outbreak of the military rebellion in northern al-Matn, the fissure has seemed great. Afterwards, remedies, meetings, and interventions continued, all in the context of remedying the causes and results of what had happened, but everything moved in an unsound direction because of the unsound attitudes of the party presidency and its continued attempts to achieve hegemony and monopoly over party decisions and powers.

Dr Marwan Faris adds: "Since the rebellion, the party has increasingly deteriorated and collapsed internally—mostly quietly, and in such a way that many people did not perceive it or know what was really taking place. Finally things reached the point where we could not bear what was happening. We therefore made our decision as Supreme Council to remove Party President 'Isam al-Muhayri."

In the same context, the members of the Supreme Council who made and approved this decision offer the following examples of reasons that led them to take a step they say publicly was unavoidable:

1. All efforts at cooperation between us and 'Isam al-Muhayri failed. The line he pursued (it is still these members of the Supreme Council who are speaking) aimed at controlling the party and its institutions by force of arms.
2. The al-Muhayri group followed a road leading to a clash with certain allies of the party, especially with the Progressive Socialist Party led by Minister Walid Junblatt and with the Amal Movement led by Minister Nabih Birri.
3. This course took a bloody turn when elements loyal to al-Muhayri carried out the assassination of two Progressive Socialist Party members, Yasir and Anwar Dabiyani, on the al-Awza'i road, south of Beirut.
4. Although the perpetrators of this assassination were discovered, Party President 'Isam al-Muhayri made no move toward imposing party punishments on them. Despite the military clashes between the SSNP and the Progressive [Socialist] Party in Beirut that followed this and 'Isam al-Muhayri's position, he himself was not in favor of punishing those who assassinated defense chief

Muhammad Salim (an operation without precedent in the party) or for taking the necessary party measures against those who rebelled in al-Matn in 1985.

5. Although we presented al-Muhayri with all the administrative and financial facilities he requested, and although we agreed to separate the 1985 revolt from the assassination of Muhammad Salim, al-Muhayri continued to ignore the party legislative and executive institutions, namely, the Supreme Council and the Council of Village Chiefs. He set out to paralyze their movements, meetings, and powers—especially those of the main party executive institution, the Council of Village Chiefs.

6. When we asked 'Isam al-Muhayri to put an end to the last manifestations of the rebel movement in the northern district of al-Matn, since those who were still there were working to dominate by force the area, with its offices of party commissioners, administrators, executives, he did not respond to our demands and rejected our suggestions. When we frequently and repeatedly invited him to attend meetings of the Supreme Council, which as the highest authority in the party elects the president and has the right to remove him, he did not attend. Finally, a few months ago, in the absence of most of the members of the Supreme Council, he convened a meeting of the Council of Village Chiefs and issued lists of appointments and party reports, all of which fit into the framework of his policy and his line, and which deviated from our line as represented by 10 of the 13 members in the Supreme Council.

### What Do Al-Muhayri's Circles Say?

On the other hand, what is being said by the circles of the deposed president, 'Isam al-Muhayri, who continues to respond to what is being said by the sources of those who rebelled against him and decided to remove him and form a new party leadership led by Jubran Jurayj? The latter is also a venerable member of the party who held many party offices during the tenure of Antoine Sa'adah and as a result of his continuous party activity obtained the rank of secretary, which is an honorary rank obtained by anyone who makes sacrifices in his work for the party.

'Isam al-Muhayri's circles begin dealing with the question from a position that registers utter amazement at the decisions and ill-considered reactions of the Supreme Council. Their comments in this context are made on the following basis:

First, it is not permissible to deal with the position and office of the party presidency by means of slander, casting doubts, or depreciating its value and importance.

Second, even if the Supreme Council were right in many of the observations it has made, its very action in deciding to remove the party president would constitute a dangerous precedent and automatically place the party on the brink of division and schism. For the party

president constitutes a moral value that cannot be overlooked; interference with this value would be considered a moral collapse of SSNP members and officials.

Third, 'Isam al-Muhayiri's history in the party is well-known and old. He was a party official in Damascus during the years 1947, 1948, and 1949, and received his orders directly from the leader, Antoine Sa'adah. He remained a party official in Damascus even after the leader was executed and the party in Damascus subjected to persecution and pursuit. He was captured, imprisoned, and made sacrifices, like thousands of Syrians. During his party career, he held many well-known positions, for which he obtained the rank of secretary. May a person with such weight in the party be treated in the manner employed by the Supreme Council?

Fourth, 'Isam al-Muhayri had neither a direct nor indirect connection with the "coup" that occurred within the party in 1975. He was in South America at the time. Indeed, when the struggle between In'am Ra'd's wing and that of Ilyas Jurji Qunayzih intensified and al-Muhayri was summoned to the presidency of the latter wing, he returned and made his acceptance of high party office conditional upon the restoration of party unity and cohesiveness. This was achieved through cooperation between him and Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah in 1978.

Fifth, 'Isam al-Muhayri has not resorted to inciting his allies against his opponents within the party, unlike what the latter attempted when they intensified their moves, contacts, and meetings in order to achieve the goal of politically and militarily besieging the party president and those on his side. Such action was perhaps not at all in keeping with the party virtue and disciplined behavior whose foundation was established by the leader Antun Sa'adah and followed by the party from its inception during the mid-thirties until the present day. In accordance with these conceptions of virtue, how can fighters incite others against the president of the very party to which they belong, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that he were wrong in their view and were violating the constitution of the party and the office of the presidency?

### Each Party Is Happy With What It Has

On this basis, the contest between the two competing wings of the SSNP in Lebanon continues, and the struggle is reflected on party members across the border in their administrative and executive offices. Each faction insists on the correctness and soundness of its viewpoint, ideas, and positions. However, all agree that the most correct and soundest thing would be to remove all causes and manifestations of division and dispute, especially after some of these manifestations have been colored by the blood spilled in the engagements that have taken place frequently and repeatedly in more than one Lebanese region and also by the physical liquidations that have taken place between members of the one party.

In light of the current political phenomenon of the division and fragmentation of virtually all institutions in Lebanon, whether official, or political, or party, or of similar nature, there are people who talk about more difficult possibilities inside the SSNP. Indeed, there are those who go so far as to state openly: "You can henceforth say that the SSNP has become three parties: one known as the party of George 'Abd-al-Masih, the second known as the party of the Supreme Council, and the third known by the name of 'Isam al-Muhayri, all of these being loyal to a man who propagated their ideology and gave his life for it. Antoine Sa'adah."

But such words remain a supposition, even if it were in the way of a "most loathsome thing permissible." While one waits for more clarity concerning the shape of what might possibly happen, the attempts and treatments continue for the situation of the party once known for the greatest quantity of discipline and for the overcoming of difficulties and ordeals, from the time of its founding, until its traversing of the stage of sufferings and operations of division and schism.

At the time these lines are being written, it is premature to say the final word.

12937

### Industrial Leader Discusses State of Local Industry

44040014h Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
17-23 Oct 87 pp 31-32

[Interview with Dr Fu'ad Abi-Salih, president of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, during a European visit by a delegation from the association: "Lebanon's Industrialists in Europe to Improve the Image of Lebanon"; name of interviewer, date, and place not given]

[Text] A Lebanese industrial delegation including about 30 businessmen, headed by Fu'ad Abi-Salih, president of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, and Salah Abu-Ra'd, vice-president of the Council for Growth and Construction, has visited a number of European capitals to explain the facts about the economic conditions in Lebanon and to conclude agreements designed to raise Lebanese production and consequently increase the size of exports to Europe. al-Mustaqbal conducted the following interview with Dr Fu'ad Abi-Salih, president of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, and obtained information about the results of the trip and the conditions under which Lebanese industry is living.

[Question] You have toured a number of European capitals. What are the purposes of this tour and the steps that have been decided upon?

[Answer] The first purpose of this tour was to publicize a Lebanon whose economic sectors are still continuing to operate in spite of the crisis and which is capable of

playing a role in the international environment, contrary to the picture that has been formed in Western public opinion. Thus we felt the need to make this tour, which included Britain, Germany, and France. We informed the relevant professional bodies that events, despite their ferocity, have not destroyed Lebanese economic activity, civilian life, or public services, and that the Lebanese are continuing to work and produce in spite of the disasters. Foreigners who visit Lebanon are not necessarily subjected to murder or kidnapping. The second purpose of the tour was to make contact with professional organizations of industrialists, merchants, and businessmen, discuss possibilities for creating opportunities for the members of the delegation to market Lebanese goods in Europe, and create joint institutions or conclude agreements to strengthen Lebanese production and increase its distribution. The overall result of this tour was good. Its positive results will become evident during the coming months.

[Question] To what extent can the Lebanese industrial sector benefit from the decline in the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound, and can a sound industrial sector be built upon such a base?

[Answer] A sound industrial sector cannot depend only on a state of affairs that may be temporary, even if experts were to agree that this state of affairs would last. We hope this situation will not last. Industry must grow and force the wage situation to improve. This contradicts the procedure of linking the success of Lebanese industry to a decrease in workers' salaries. But Lebanese industry, which has passed through great difficulties during recent years, and which was and remains in need of financing, has been completely deprived of both financing and complete normal and regular infrastructures. The decline in the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound constitutes the one helpful factor that has enabled Lebanese industry to compete and thus return to productive activity. In the past, when the minimum wage was about \$370, industry was able to continue producing and exporting, and the size of exports exceeded what it is today. Therefore, I do not link the success and growth of Lebanese industry to a decline in the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound and a consequent decline in the purchasing power of the Lebanese. On the contrary, I think the only reliable means for increasing wages in Lebanon is to strengthen industry, agriculture, and the productive sectors that are still able to produce.

[Question] How do you explain the apparent contradiction between the growth of exports and the retention by imports of their large place in domestic consumption?

[Answer] Imports have not retained their former large place. On the contrary, they have declined from their 1981 level, and even from the 1983 level. What happened is that some subsidized commodities were imported excessively in order to smuggle them abroad. In addition, a large part of Lebanese imports are not

intended for domestic consumption, but for re-exporting. In the absence of customs duties, Lebanon has become something like a free zone. What has declined is consumption: its percentage of decline exceeds the percentage of decline of imports. What has increased is the importation of raw materials and of some commodities needed by industry.

[Question] Is the growth of Lebanese industry only quantitative, or is it qualitative also?

[Answer] The greatest amount of increased productivity was a result of reactivating firms that already existed in Lebanon, and not from newly constructed firms. As is well-known, before 1982, Lebanese industry was unable to put its full productive power into operation. After 1982, this level dropped. In 1983 and 1984, the percentage of productive capacity put into operation did not exceed 15 percent. Thus the increase in industrial production can be ascribed more to the detailing of existing capacity than to the introduction of new productive units that would require the investment of hard currency unavailable under the present circumstances.

[Question] What role do the Lebanese banks play in financing Lebanese industry?

[Answer] This is the essence of the problem from which the Lebanese industrial sector is suffering. In the past, the commercial and service sector absorbed the largest part of credit. Industry, despite the importance of its development role, obtained a small part of bank credit. Unfortunately, after the decline of the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound, the monetary authorities decided to confront this decline by sucking up local cash from the market. They forced the banks to earmark about 80 to 90 percent of their reserves to finance treasury bonds and imposed upon them very high interest rates, ranging from 40 to 50 percent. This has deprived industry of any bank credit. This is the essence of the problem which we are dealing with today in Lebanon with the monetary authorities, and specifically, with the central bank.

12937

## MOROCCO

**Aircraft Repair Agreement Reached With Portugal**  
35420003x Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese  
22 Sep 87 p 4

[Article by N. R.]

[Text] The visit paid to Portugal by Gen. Mohammed Kabbaj, Royal Moroccan Air Force inspector (the equivalent of Air Force chief of staff) is of importance to our country. This importance does not derive solely from his importance as a personality, although General Kabbaj is one of the leading figures in the Moroccan military

apparatus, second in hierarchic rank only to King Hassan II (who is chief of the General Staff). This importance also has to do with the matters taken up with the Portuguese military authorities, and above all, what they may mean for a Lisbon-Rabat axis, which, as is known, is wanted by both the Portuguese and the Moroccan commands.

Gen Mohammed Kabbaj (who was one of those responsible for neutralizing the attempted coup d'état by republican Berber officers, which had Algerian and Libyan support) engaged in negotiations, while in Lisbon, for the repair of airplanes coming from Morocco (P-3) at the General Aeronautical Equipment Workshop in Alverca. It is a question of making this service, which will also repair Spanish Air Force planes, profitable. This facility is regarded as having good-quality operational capacity (aircraft repair), and can in this way contribute to a budget improvement for the Portuguese Air Force.

Insofar as it has been possible to learn, a proposal was made and a protocol is being drafted for signing. The Moroccan general visited Alverca and learned in detail about the Portuguese potential.

When the chief of staff of the Portuguese Air Force, Gen Lemos Ferreira (presently chief of the Armed Forces General Staff) was in Morocco, he learned about the manifest interest expressed in Rabat in close collaboration between the two countries, whose strategic areas extend over the Atlantic, a sensitive zone the key to which is presently to be found in Spain.

Morocco, which is involved with Spain on the issue of Ceuta and Melilla, would look favorably on a shift in the strategic command to Portugal. And certainly this desire felt by Rabat would be welcomed here, for Lisbon would enjoy some advantages, if only because this would strengthen the strategic importance of Portugal.

Now that the problem of the withdrawal of U.S. bases from Spain is being discussed and Madrid is concerned with the southern European flank of NATO, the Portuguese-Moroccan area has acquired added value. The United States forces have bases in the Azores (Lajes) and Kenitra (Morocco), just a few kilometers from Rabat-Sale, and a future American withdrawal from Rota and Tarragon would force the Pentagon to seek other strategic points for locating its potential.

And here both Lisbon and Rabat have an interest—Beja and Porto Santo are available. The United States has already had other bases in Morocco, in addition to Kenitra, and there is every indication that the Moroccan government would be receptive to a proposal put forward by Washington. More than once the possibilities of Morocco and Portugal as alternatives to the bases in Spain have been mentioned in the United States, although denials have always followed.

It is probable that these matters came up for discussion during the visit paid by General Kabbaj, which was very likely a great deal more than a mere courtesy or protocol visit.

5157

## TUNISIA

### Communist Leader Discusses Relations With Islamic Tendency Movement

45040004a London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic  
5 Oct 87 pp 17-19

[Interview with Communist Party Secretary General Mohamed Harmel by Slami Husni]

[Text] The recent developments witnessed by the political scene in Tunisia have reaffirmed the highly critical situation that has befallen the recognized and unrecognized opposition movements. While some of them have frankly refused to make any press statements, perhaps to avoid stating a position on the issue of religious extremism, and others are wavering, the Communist Party has gladly articulated its analysis of events and the issue of religious extremism. The Communist Party has come together in past years with the Islamic Tendency Movement as a party to opposition meetings and in joint statements; this sort of meeting in itself has prompted awe and amazement, since how could a party like the Communist Party agree to meet with an extremist religious organization and work to destroy the present social pattern and replace it with a backward one? Mohamed Harmel, at this meeting with al-Dustur, answered this question and others. This is a conversation which follows the interview that al-Dustur published with Abdelaziz Ben Dia, director of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party in Tunisia, in which he stated the ruling party's position on opposition movements. Mohamed Harmel is the secretary general of the Tunisian Communist Party and was elected at the party's ninth conference held a few months ago. This meeting, with Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dia's interview, represents the beginning of the "national dialogue" which is called for today in Tunisia. Al-Dustur's goal is to participate in this sort of national dialogue, which will spare Tunisia strife, especially the factional strife which the "commander" of the extremist Islamic Tendency Movement has in mind.

[Question] The first question is, there are a number of groups which accuse the Communist Party of allying itself with the Islamic Tendency Movement. To what extent have you allied yourself with it? To what extent have you stood against it? If you have allied yourself with it in the past, how can you ally yourself with a backward social pattern?

[Answer] To meet with one of the parties that is on the scene and to hold a dialogue with it does not necessarily form an alliance, and to criticize the positions of one party or another does not necessarily constitute an attack or aggression.

As regards our relations with the Islamic Tendency Movement, we already replied to these erroneous views at the ninth conference and said that we have met with various opposition movements. In this context we have met with the Islamic Tendency Movement as well. It has been an opportunity which I consider a positive one to learn about others and have a dialogue with them, whatever our disputes with them might have been, and to give concrete form to joint democratic action with the opposition in its various groups. For example, the Islamic Tendency Movement was on our side in the protest against the bombing of Hamam El Chatt and the aggression against Libya. At the conference, we said that we did not have regrets about these meetings, which are imparting new traditions to a civilized, intellectual dialogue with people who want to conduct a dialogue with us, even if we differ fundamentally with them over a number of points—and it is no secret to anyone that we have fundamental differences with the Islamic Tendency Movement. These meetings have not prevented us from openly declaring the truth and articulating the dangers which arise from the use of religion and the spread of fundamentalist notions. Indeed, we have severely condemned an attempt which the Islamic Tendency Movement made to contest the personal status law, and we have made a determined defense of the democratic and progressive gains. However, the intellectual and political struggle here is not a war of aggression in which the other party must arbitrarily cease to exist, because we believe in pluralism and because we are dealing with a complex, inconsistent state of affairs in a political, intellectual and civilized way in which we believe in intellectual and political struggle in its civilized, dialectical sense, aimed at changing the society in a progressive and socialist direction, not arbitrarily or by imposing the positions of a minority, even if they are progressive, but by changing the balance of forces on the political and intellectual stage in favor of progress and by supporting the role of the social forces which are qualified to guarantee this process and mobilize the workers and young people on democratic, progressive grounds. These meetings and disputes are not inconsistent, proceeding from our view of the treatment of political and intellectual disputes. Therefore we have clearly and unambiguously rejected arbitrary action against the leaders of the Islamic Tendency Movement. And we have stringently opposed and resisted the trials and sentences, especially the death sentences, in spite of the nature of their goals, this movement and its fundamentalist coloring, which is deeply rooted in it and makes it a political and ideological movement of a special kind although there are potential dangers at the heart of its ideology. We have rejected having the dangers which might arise from religious political orientations met with repression, as long as they are political and ideological orientations,

and we have rejected having the political and intellectual struggle changed by the methods of repression and imprisonment and the treatment of the problems of actual conditions in an arbitrary manner, even if they are against progress. We oppose the Islamic Tendency Movement's conceptions of the future, proceed from the social and ideological situation with all its complexities, contradictions and proliferation of intellectually and politically conflicting currents in the context of the class and social struggle, and work to separate the progressive and democratic forces and give concrete form to their role, and to have progressive ideas dominate. It is worth observing that the ruling party bears significant responsibility with respect to the acts of encouragement it offered the religious currents in the seventies, especially in education and the schools, with the goal of resisting the left, and this current turned into a political and ideological entity in opposition to the regime itself.

This state of affairs exists as a result of these acts of encouragement and also as a result of the crisis the country is going through. How can we deal with this state of affairs? The only solution is in political and intellectual struggle, various forms of freedom and treatment of the crisis in a serious manner on the people's behalf. In the context of this political and intellectual struggle, we propound a group of ideas which represent the background in principle for unmasking the exploitation of religion in politics. In 1980, when the Islamic Tendency Movement became prominent on the scene, we said that we would not agree that it should be a representative of religion or its spokesman or trustee, and that this was a political and ideological movement of a special kind, which proceeds from a special interpretation of religion and uses it to serve its political and ideological plan. We said that the struggle in Tunisia, which is an Islamic country, is not between Muslims and non-Muslims, between believers and nonbelievers, but is an economic, social and political struggle, and that any attempt to turn it into a religious struggle and force religion into it will assuredly lead to well known dangers, as happened in Iran.

Tunisian society is an Islamic society. It is not at all relevant to broadcast the call to Islam in it and Islamize it, as they say, and no threat to Islam exists in Tunisia. Islam does not need defenders, and no enemies of Islam exist in Tunisia. The people who say "I am defending Islam" are in reality defending their own interpretation of Islam behind which there are specific political and intellectual programs whose connection to religion is one of ideological exploitation which might entail the dangers of religious extremism, no matter what inner convictions and desire to spread the teachings of Islam there might be. Therefore we demand a knowledge of the real political and future goals which lie behind the apparent religious position. We have said this with full clarity, and we have written it and articulated it in spite of our full respect for the leaders and members of the Islamic Tendency Movement. We have stated it in a manner which is convincing to everyone, including of course the



people who are sympathetic to it, and we have defended their rights to exist in the context of pluralism and their right to adhere to their ideas and their convictions.

It is the Communist Party which has raised the essential issues of principle, defended progressive gains and ideas, resisted reactionary and fundamentalist conceptions, and presented the framework in principle for dealing with them and the position on pre-socialist social, intellectual, and political contradictions. Even in the context of a socialist system where the majority embraces socialist ideas, it is nonetheless possible that there may be unprogressive ideas within it; and progressive ideas may not impose themselves arbitrarily and through repression.

[Question] It is said that after the Sousse and Monastir outbursts, there were contacts between the opposition movements and the government. Is this true? Where were these contacts made?

[Answer] Unfortunately, the government tried only some very limited contacts through the minister of information. He contacted us after the outbursts but the contact was only for information on what had happened. However, the dialogue we have been seeking for some time is a dialogue with the government on conditions in the country and ways of coping with the crisis. This dialogue has not yet been achieved.

[Question] In such a dialogue, would you have practical recommendations?

[Answer] Of course. The first recommendation we have is for the government to eliminate all the obstacles which it has put in the way of union and political freedoms. The union movement has been assaulted, the political movements have been besieged, and the opposition press has constantly been silenced. The stage is almost characterized by polarization between the government on one hand and the Islamic Tendency Movement on the other. This is no help in resisting the dangers, but rather increases them. Meanwhile, the granting of freedoms, the elimination of barriers to democratic political action, and the enabling of the democratic and progressive forces to express their opinions and positions (including differences with the government) and to play their role in full, these are the solution for confronting the dangers which threaten the country, including the dangers of the spread of religious extremism and fundamentalism. It is also the duty of the democratic and progressive movements to act on their own ground and assume their responsibilities with respect to the deterioration of conditions in the context of a plan of struggle alongside public opinion, the masses, and all democratic forces of various ideologies.

[Question] But the government says that the opposition movements have no clear positions.

[Answer] Our positions are clear, but being clear as far as the government goes is for us to give it absolute support on this issue, while we have more than one reservation regarding its treatment of the issues. Indeed, we have a clear opposition to the system of arbitrariness and repression, not to speak about our well known opposition on a number of crucial issues, which is a responsible, serious opposition which holds tenaciously to the national gains, the republican system and the principle of dialogue and is aware of all dangers, including the dangers of slipping into the unknown.

Who will control the destiny of the country if the crisis is aggravated? Will the security, the army and the militias govern it or will all the responsible national and democratic forces which are able to stand up to all dangers, indeed alone are able to do so, govern it?

[Question] There is an appeal for a dialogue in the latest communique of the opposition parties. Dialogue on what grounds?

[Answer] On the grounds that the national opposition is prepared to take part in solving the country's growing problems, because the problems and dangers are not restricted to religious extremism and because there are broad forces in Tunisian society which are able to stand up to all the dangers on democratic and popular ground.

[Question] What exactly is the formula for participation?

[Answer] We are prepared for dialogue, but the dialogue has not begun and the government is holding a dialogue with us by means of administrative measures, harassment and constant prosecution of the newspaper *AL-TARIQ AL-JADID*.

[Question] Do you request that it hold a dialogue with you through a political official?

[Answer] By serious means, if it is convinced that there are national forces which are able to take part in solving the problems which have arisen before the country in a responsible manner. At that point dialogue will become possible. It is one of the principles of dialogue that it be given the force of the most basic democratic rights. We are a recognized party but we do not have real freedom to act. Our newspaper has constantly been proscribed just for making criticism, heavy fines have been imposed on it, the party's publications are being confiscated and permits are not being granted for public meetings.

This old view is the one which blocks treatment of the problems — the view of relying on security, the courts and arbitrary action. This view is no longer proper in these circumstances in which Tunisian society is changing radically and young Tunisians no longer believe in its feasibility, especially since the country is in an economic and social crisis and is suffering from unemployment, in particular unemployment among young people, even

people holding higher degrees. We are not exploiting this situation to establish a grievance over it or to declare demagogic slogans. To the contrary.

[Question] In accordance with your statement, if the director of the Destourian Socialist Party contacted you and asked for the issuance of a joint position, would you agree or not?

[Answer] We have not talked about formulas. It is easy to find the appropriate formulas. We are talking about the approach toward dialogue and the real desire for it.

The regime is still tenaciously holding to an old attitude, which is the attitude of the "strong" party and that of the party which has "masses" that sympathize with it. It is the attitude of the years inbetween 1956 and 1970. It is an attitude which ignores the actual situation which the country and the people are going through, and it must be reviewed, if only in part, because a shift from the old to the new is difficult for the Destourian Party, which experienced the arrogance of victory, the arrogance of an absolute monopoly of the affairs of the country, and the arrogance of popularity in the fifties and even the sixties. However, this is a state of affairs which has passed and gone, never to return.

Getting the people to participate in the condescending manner of the Destourian Party, the national organizations, and so on is no longer feasible. The situation requires their participation as a party with their ideologies and various forces, which have an analysis, proceeding from the actual state of pluralism in Tunisia. This situation, which has not been grasped by the regime to this day, is a state of affairs which is threatened with encroachment, paralysis, and marginalization. Making pluralism and the democratic oppositions marginal is what encourages extremism, be it religious or not. It is worth observing that we in particular rely on the role of the progressive democratic nationalist forces, on the workers, the young people, and the left to create combative mobility which will transform public opinion from the passive observation of events and watchfulness and will work to stand up to all threats of various kinds by reliance on the masses of the people.

[Question] Let us move over to another subject, which is that of the Maghreb. There is thought of Maghreb unity, or a kind of confederation.

[Answer] This idea has existed for more than 30 years, and all movements, both those in and out of power, raise the slogan of building the Maghreb. However, it remains an idea without any substance, in spite of some steps regarding cooperation among some countries. Even the cooperation itself assumes a bilateral form between two countries and excludes third ones. We are still far away from this plan, which we are tenaciously adhering to for our part, and we believe that venturing toward it economically, socially, and culturally requires—first of all—getting rid of the idea of introversion then dominance;

second, of the idea of assimilation which rejects particular characteristics while we believe that there are particular characteristics in the Maghreb which must be observed; and third, getting rid of the notion of hastiness and "the burning of stages" so that the structure may be on intelligent foundations and in stages, and be free of narrow calculations.

[Question] The final question is related to the Soviet Union's new policy, specifically Gorbachev's policy. What are its repercussions on the Arab nation? How do Tunisian and Arab Communists view this new policy?

[Answer] We found good tidings in Gorbachev's policy and the policy of the Soviet Communist Party from the start, because we saw a serious attempt in these policies to rectify economic and social conditions in the Soviet Union and get rid of the obstacles which have accumulated in spite of the great achievements which have been realized in all stages and in all fields. What Gorbachev is doing at the head of the Soviet Communist Party has a revolutionary coloring, and this course of the Soviet Union's—which has positive repercussions on its role as well as its image abroad, since biased propaganda has sought to distort this image—gladdens us as Arabs who are allies of the Soviet Union. This is enough for us as Arabs, not to mention the support which the Soviet Union has constantly offered to the Arab peoples, standing by their side.

11887

### **Background, Implications of Ben Ali's Rise Discussed**

*45040005 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
10 Oct 87 pp 14-15*

Article by As'ad Haydar: "Tunisia: The Military Comes To Power Without a Coup"]

[Text] "It was a white coup without a Communique Number One, a coup which from the standpoint of timing and characters had been expected since the early summer. Therefore, the Tunisians were the last ones to be surprised at the new change made by President Habib Bourguiba as the day of rest, Friday, drew to an end." This was the first remark made by a member of the Tunisian opposition who has been living in Paris for some time.

Interior Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, whom the Tunisian president appointed prime minister and secretary general of the Destourian Party, had become a shining star in the Tunisian political firmament and a prominent member of the "succession club" ever since the bread riots of 1984. Before his star began ascending, he had made his presence known on the Tunisian political scene in spite of his military title, which has usually been a major barrier to the aspirations of any other Tunisian official. Ever since the Yusuf coup attempt of the Sixties, President Bourguiba has had an exaggerated

sensitivity, amounting to wariness and hatred, towards anything "military" or even connected with the military. General Ben Ali, who does not want anyone to call him "General," is calm, disciplined, reserved, practical, and totally conservative in his political, personal, and social relations. Every step he takes is well thought out and governed by his long-standing, avowed ambition to be a man for all crises. Every one of Tunisia's "crises" has given him a new push in his "rocket-like" climb up the ladder of power.

The Yusuf coup attempt propelled Ben Ali up the ladder of military intelligence. The 1978 General Federation of Labor crisis brought him to the National Security Directorate. In 1984 the bread riots promoted him to the position of Interior Minister. The clashes with the Islamic Tendency Movement pushed him even higher, to minister of state. Now the death sentences for Islamic Tendency members and fear for the future have made him the number two man in the government. This is the hardest number to be, because it always reminds the number one man, President Bourguiba, of "the end and the succession!"

The open confrontation between the government and the Islamic Tendency Movement, which has led to 71 major, volatile demonstrations within just a few weeks; the arrest and sentencing of 1,500 movement members; the trials at Badu Barracks, some sessions of which the French press described as "surrealist spectacles" because the judge was the state's attorney general; and the increasing talk about the Great Struggler's desire to execute ten Islamic Tendency leaders after outbursts in Monastir and Sousse on 3 August, the president's birthday—all this has brought Tunisia face-to-face with the unknown. What made things even worse was that the Great Struggler had begun changing his ministers very fast; every other morning a new decree would be issued appointing this or that minister. In addition, the Great Struggler was closing his ears to all messages and advice to tone down the confrontation, so that the unthinkable would not happen and Tunisia would not become another Lebanon.

In this context, it is only natural to point out that Zine El Abidine Ben Ali has himself passed through some very hard times. It was even said, "Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's position was not very pretty [zayn]" after his ideological mentor and townsman (they are both from Hammam Souss) Hedi Baccouche was removed from his position as director of the ruling party. This difficult situation made Ben Ali turn increasingly to Mansour Skhiri for support in order to make his situation as solid as rock. However, overnight things changed rapidly. Skhiri was "floating." He was moved from his stronghold at Qasr Qurtaj to his main base at the ministry, and Ben Ali and the "Iron Man," Mohamad Sayah, became ministers of state. This rise and fall on the ladder of succession has been going on ever since the "succession club" opened in Tunisia, but the problem is that this has begun to have repercussions on Tunisia itself.

It is no secret to anyone that during the past few years, the "war of succession" and the presidential decrees have deprived Tunisia of its most outstanding persons and politicians. Things have reached such a point that a prominent, educated Tunisian politician summarized the situation for us as follows: "Bourguiba is emptying Tunisia in stages, instead of all at once like Anwar al-Sadat did in Egypt in September 1981. These steps are creating a vacuum in political life. Whenever there is a vacuum, the factors of domestic and foreign pressure inevitably produce an explosion." The Tunisian politician continued his analysis, saying, "The time was when Tunisia had politics and politicians, and the army was shut up by itself within the walls of the barracks. But if there is a vacuum, the army will enter the political decision-making circle, and this will mean the end of the last 'civilian republic' in Africa!"

This realistic analysis, in the context of the growth of the Islamic Tendency and the escalating confrontation between it and the government, has placed bittersweet possibilities before Tunisia and its regional and international surroundings: if there is an explosion, and the army stays in the barracks, this means the Lebanonization of Tunisia; and, if there is an explosion and the walls of the barracks come down, this means the militarization of the regime.

All this is a distressing matter for regional and international forces. The situation has reached the point that the desires of the regional forces, i.e. Algeria and Libya, and the international powers, i.e. France and the United States, are obviously "intersecting."

As a group, these four powers do not want an "Islamic regime led by the Islamic Tendency Movement or anyone else."

Neither do they want an explosion which lead to an African Lebanon at this geopolitically-sensitive location, since Tunisia is the link which binds North Africa. Finally, the idea that a military regime might be established distresses the regional forces, whoever they are and whether they are rightist or leftist.

In addition to all this, establishing a movement similar to Mrs. Aquino's movement in the Philippines has become meaningless in the context of the failure of the "National Experiment." The establishment of a movement similar to the Sudan's 6 April movement has also become more difficult in view of the difficulties being faced by the remnants of the movement and the present chief of state, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. For all of these reasons, the only thing left to everyone is the "middle solution," a solution which according to them would be hard to bring about.

General Zine El Abidine Ben Ali combines all the required conditions. He is a general, a man of security and hard tasks. He is a politician who has been used to



responsibilities and duties for some time. He is a diplomat who has served in Rabat and Budapest. Finally, and most importantly, he is responsive to the tendencies of international and regional forces. General Ben Ali does not hide his firm links with the United States, although he absolutely refuses to be called "America's first man" in Tunisia. He is all for good relations with Algeria, and the first to congratulate him on becoming prime minister was Algeria's prime minister. As for Libya, Col al-Qadhafi suggested his name for interior minister of the short-lived Libyan-Tunisian union. Also in this context, the advent of Ben Ali, although it appeared to strengthen American influence at the expense of French influence, was accompanied by the fact that last spring some French circles were referring to "an agreement between Washington and Paris to divide up their concerns over this strategically sensitive country; Washington would take the strategic security aspect, leaving the domestic and cultural aspects to France." The question now is: How will this tendency be implemented in the daily activities of Tunisian political life? Can the visit of the French fleet's commander to Tunisia, and his meeting with President Bourguiba on the eve of Ben Ali's appointment, be considered sheer coincidence?

If Ben Ali, or Zine, as the French press has begun calling him, is "a man for all crises," then the crisis he is now facing, now that he is in a position to make decisions, has no concrete form. Rather, it is actually a group of crises, some of them explosive and others impediments and obstacles hindering movement or hidden from sight. Without ranking them according to importance or seriousness, the crises facing Zine are as follows:

1. Solving the conflict with the Islamic trend and its spearhead, the Islamic Tendency Movement, in whatever way is best. During the trials, President Habib Bourguiba presented the entire government with two options, both of which were extremely difficult. To carry out the verdicts, no matter how even-handed they might be, would mean intensifying the confrontation and exposing Tunisia to threats from the Islamic Jihad Organization. Everyone knows that Zine is at the head of the list. Backing off from implementing the verdicts would mean offering an obvious concession to a nascent movement which had dared to step over all the red lines by demonstrating, speaking out against the head of state, and directly confronting the police—not to mention the bombs of Monastir and Sousse which the movement denied setting off in whole or in part. All of this meant that Zine had to look for a third option in order to get out of this crisis: "further steps towards democracy, political openness towards all the opposition forces, and granting these forces full, not nominal, legitimacy." Washington and Paris both demanded this policy of openness, and Bourguiba is still calling for it, because repression increases manifestations of violence. The question is: can Zine prevail over the General? Some people say that he can, and in order to sense this trend we need only recall what the prime minister said after his meeting with

the Great Struggler, which was tantamount to a "government statement." Zine said, "With His Excellency's guidance, we shall work to further support national unity on the basis of Bourguibian principles, which are based on direct contacts, responsible dialog, and accord in order to achieve the higher interests of Tunisia."

However, others say, "How can Zine carry out this policy when someone like Mahjoub Ben Ali was appointed Party Director? Last spring this person formed 'awareness groups;' he was the 'spearhead' in quelling the demonstrations; and he directed the investigations which led to the killing of seven detainees, as confirmed by the international Human Rights Organization."

Will the "Zine" personality and abilities emerge? Will he succeed in acting and making decisions in the shadow of the Great Struggler?

2. Confronting the economic situation, which is a difficult one in spite of international loans and aid which have recently amounted to US\$1.8 billion, as Minister of Planning and Finance Ismail Khelil confirmed in an interview with al-Sabah on 28 September 1987. One manifestation of the difficult economic situation has been the closing of the Sita-1 automotive assembly plants and the plans to close the Sita-2 plants. This difficult situation was made even harder by the fact that the labor unions have not yet been restored in body, in spite of many attempts. In Zine's remarks we also see a desire for more openness in order to strengthen the economy, since in his last speech he spoke of "the need to mobilize all the vital, productive workers' and employees' forces in order to get them to participate in stimulating the country's economic activity and achieving our development goals, which include creating a flourishing, open society and maintaining individual rights governed by tolerance, security, and tranquility."

3. Facing up to the realities of the attempt to establish a new union between Algeria and Libya, which is expected to be announced early next month. This union would not upset existing balances in the Arab Maghreb, but would create new balances. Here Tunisia must calculate its steps very carefully, so that refusal will not mean choosing opposition, and acceptance will not mean yielding to pressure!

4. Zine's arrival at the top of the ladder in the succession club does not mean that things are settled. Five others, more senior than he, preceded him there, and they were all brought down with one stroke of the Great Struggler's green pen. Therefore, the struggle will continue to blaze, especially since there are many strong persons aspiring to the succession, especially Mansour Skhiri, Hedi Mabrouk, and Mohamed Sayah. Here Zine's abilities to pursue his tactics may emerge, with the help of Former Party Director and Present Minister of Social Affairs Hedi Baccouche. Hedi Mabrouk was originally the third member of the Zayn-Baccouche alliance. Whether or not

Zine can win over Education Minister and Party Iron Man Sayah will be the measure of his success or failure, at least during the lifetime of the Great Struggler!

In his speech, Prime Minister Ben Ali stressed the need "to support the republican system and strengthen its organizations." This emphasis can only be understood as "a general's statement to reassure the civilians in his country." Are we now seeing a new experiment after the Sudan and the Philippines? A general's experiment at the head of a republican regime and a civilian government? Who will win in the end—the general or Zine?

8559

## YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

### Al-Iryani Describes Success of Foreign Policy

44040013 Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
26 Sep 87 p 9

[Interview with Foreign Minister Dr 'Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani: "We Have Opened Up to The World and The World Has Opened to Us"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Even though our foreign policy at the Arab, Islamic and international levels has been obvious and clear to all ever since the glorious day of 26 September—apart from its purity, strong foundations, constancy and judiciousness—it was logical, on this most splendid occasion and the most joyous celebration, that al-Thawrah go to the person responsible for foreign policy. The idea was not to obtain clarifications—for our policy is clear in its features and dimensions not just to us in Yemen but to other brothers and friends—but rather to explore new issues and compare our country's policy during the old era of the imamate with our policy in the September era. Since foreign ministers everywhere are known as foreign policy engineers, it was only natural that the al-Thawrah reporter go to Dr 'Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani, deputy prime minister, foreign minister and permanent committee member, to put to him a number of questions on the silver anniversary of the Yemeni revolution, the glorious 26 September Revolution. Dr al-Iryani was kind enough to answer our questions. Following are the questions and answers:

[Question] How do you assess our foreign policy and activities at the Arab, Islamic and international levels and can you give us specifics about our activities and large presence at the Arab, Islamic and international levels?

[Answer] It would not be an exaggeration to say that our foreign policy is balanced and judicious and has won the respect and appreciation of all brothers and friends. This is due to our country's total commitment to foreign policy objectives as prescribed in the 5th and 6th goals of the glorious revolution and clearly outlined and elucidated in the 5th chapter of the National Charter.

An examination of our foreign policy over a quarter of a century shows that in the face of the tremendous tasks we had to face as Yemenis from the first days of the republican system in confronting conspiracies aimed at crushing the revolution, our foreign dealings at the beginning of the revolution were shaped by the world's attitude toward us. It was natural that relations with these fraternal and friendly countries that stood by our revolution should be strengthened.

Following the revolution's success in consolidating the republican system and the global realization that the Yemeni people will not forego their right to choose their destinies, as represented in a republican regime, revolution, freedom, development and progress, the revolution's foreign policy was put on an active course. We opened up to the world and the world opened up to us and we embarked on what we call a policy of development with a view to realizing the revolution's remaining objectives and to meeting the people and the country's needs for a better life and for realizing their ambitions in development.

From the time the development program went into effect in the mid-seventies up until now, in the last 17 years, under the leadership of the president and commander-in-chief to be exact, our relations with all the countries of the world have grown extensively and expanded. All international, regional and Arab organizations have helped us achieve the construction and development Yemen and the Yemeni people are now enjoying. Our foreign dealings were and still are based on certain unalterable constants, namely the inviolability of Yemen's honor, political and economic independence and national and territorial unity; cooperation based on equality and mutual respect; commitment to the Arab League charter and the joint defense treaty that confers a special quality on our Arab relations, the Arab Gulf states in particular; and, above all, unwavering commitment to the policy of nonalignment, support for and affirmation of Islamic solidarity, commitment to UN goals and principles and continued support for the people's right to self-determination and rejection of the policy of racial discrimination.

In recent years, or rather in the last decade of the revolution, a large number of domestic political goals have been accomplished in the area of democratic gains for the Yemeni people, in particular the establishment of the General People's Congress, the ratification of the national charter, the establishment of local councils for cooperative development and the achievement of political stability and social security. These gains have been reflected in our foreign policy, thus gaining more respect from the world around us at the various Arab, Islamic and international levels. Take the Arab scene for example. It may be said that our country is one of the few Arab states, if not the only one, that maintain excellent and advanced relations with all other Arab countries. Accordingly, it has been able to play an active and vital role in the constant call for solidarity and Arab unity and

renunciation of conflict. This is one thing. The other thing is that our country affirms its pan-Arab commitments to many of our crucial causes, in the forefront of which is, of course, the Palestinian cause. We have and still are offering every possible kind of moral and material assistance to the Palestinian cause under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in support of their national struggle and restoration of their inalienable national right. We have condemned all unilateral solutions or those that are unacceptable to the Palestinian people because their inalienable rights are ignored.

Furthermore, we have reaffirmed our strong commitment to the joint solidarity agreement through our well-known position on the gulf war and our support of the Iraqi people in their defense of their territory and sovereignty even though we are grieved by Iran's intransigent attitude toward all the various attempts to end the war, to spare Muslim blood and to maintain the Muslims' ability to face the real foe, the Zionist enemy.

In short, our country's positions on the various aggressions committed against the Arab countries, be they in Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Sudan or any other Arab territory, are well known.

As for our country's Islamic standing, the Islamic community remembers how Sanaa embraced the 15th conference of the Islamic countries' foreign ministers in December 1984 and the adopted resolution of this conference and the high level of attendance which reflected Yemen's high ranking in the Islamic world.

With regard to the Nonaligned Movement, President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's speech before the 7th summit meeting in New Delhi in 1983 in behalf of the Asian group said much about our country's standing with the nonaligned countries. On the international level, our country is actively involved in the activities of the UN and all its international organizations and our active role was prominently displayed when our country was chosen to fill one of the vice-chairman seats in the 39th session of the General Assembly.

[Question] What is the status of our diplomatic relations with the various countries of the world?

[Answer] Our resident diplomatic representation abroad includes 36 embassies and permanent delegations, one consulate in Jeddah and 5 other consulates, the latest of which is in Istanbul. As for Arab foreign missions and international organizations in Sanaa, there are 35 embassies, 5 consulates and 5 offices for international and Arab organizations.

Regarding our nonresident representation, we maintain relations with over 50 countries, thus bringing the total number of diplomatic representations with the world, both resident and nonresident, to about 90.

[Question] To what extent have our foreign relations expanded under the presidency of Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih?

[Answer] Our international relations have expanded considerably during the presidency of Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. Many embassies have been opened in the last 10 years in each of Jordan, Pakistan, India, Japan, Holland, Switzerland and Tunis, in addition to 6 consulates. Furthermore, all nonresident representations were established during his regime.

This, of course, is a clear indication that our country's political leaders, under the leadership of President and Commander-in-Chief Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, are quite interested in opening up to the world in a way that serves our national and pan-Arab interests, on the one hand, and that the president is personally aware of the need to look after Yemeni emigrants throughout the world in order to protect their interests and maintain their bond with their homeland, on the other hand. Moreover, our relations have been expanded with all the countries of the world without exception.

Our country's role has manifested itself at the Arab, regional and international levels, something that has been mirrored in the Arab and world media's interest in our country and the remarkable increase in recent years in the number of conferences, meetings and seminars held in Sanaa. Add to that our country's extensive presence in various political forums and the exchange of visits at the various levels with all fraternal and friendly countries.

[Question] What kind of relations did Yemen maintain prior to the revolution?

[Answer] Yemen's relations under the old imamate rule were very simple and served the regime's objectives of retreat and isolation from the outside world to further the policy of isolation, stultification and backwardness.

There were no more than 10 legations, either foreign ones in Yemen or Yemeni ones abroad.

[Question] What about our relations with international organizations and agencies?

[Answer] Our relations with organizations, agencies and funds, be they Arab, regional or international, are excellent. These institutions have played a key role in financing a very large number of development projects included in our development plans. Indeed, they have played a praiseworthy role in backing the sound precise planning process of the development plans, beginning with the 3-year development program which was implemented in 1973-76. This positive and active role is greatly appreciated.

Notwithstanding the discovery of oil which will be exported soon and will no doubt bring in new revenues, we are intent on maintaining our relations with all organizations, agencies and funds and to assist and support them in view of the momentous developmental responsibilities placed on the government to proceed with and enhance the economic and social development process which is still in its infancy despite the great accomplishments that have been realized to date.

[Question] What was the first country to recognize the republican regime?

[Answer] The United Arab Republic, namely Egypt, was the first one to recognize the republican regime a few days after the outbreak of the 26 September revolution. That was on 29 September 1962.

12502

## INDIA

### **Commentary Alleges Pakistan Nuclear Purchase From Turkey**

46000016 *Cochin THE WEEK in English*  
1 Nov 87 p 49

[Article by Munish Gupta: "Turkish Conspiracy—Zia Shops in Ankara for Nuclear Gadgets"]

[Text] Has Pakistan found yet another partner in its diabolical nuclear project? Many in Washington believe so. The new partner, according to them, is another ally of the United States, Turkey.

It is believed that Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq's recent visit to Ankara (his third in 7 years) was with the purpose of making secret arrangements to ship certain sensitive electronic tools for Pakistan's nuclear reactors. The United States Government had admitted, as early as June, that Turkey had been shipping various other equipment worth millions of dollars to Pakistan. And what irks Washington most is the fact that most of these equipment are of U.S. and NATO origin. Turkey, a NATO ally, is alleged to have been diverting these equipment from Europe.

The U.S. State Department has already warned both Turkey and Pakistan of a cut-off in American aid if they went ahead with the clandestine operation. But the Turkish Government officially takes an innocent attitude, saying that it is some of the private companies in the country that are involved in the operation, and pleads that there is no law that can prevent the companies from doing so.

It is believed that the equipment is supplied by a Turkish firm to its subsidiary in Pakistan. Since there are laws that prevent shipment of nuclear components wholesale, the company has been sending the equipment piece by piece. The equipment involved now includes inverters which are used in the process of enriching uranium.

In fact, the U.S. State Department had known about the purpose of Zia's visit long ago. In July Under-Secretary Michael Armacost of the State Department had a long discussion on the implications of Zia's visit to Ankara with Strausz-Hupe, the U.S. ambassador in Ankara. That Armacost flew to Ankara for this purpose shows how concerned Washington is over the matter.

The State Department also believes that Pakistan is likely to reciprocate the Turkish goodwill by recognising the Turkish republic of northern Cyprus, in violation of UN regulations. If Islamabad does so, Pakistan will be the first country to recognise Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus.

Turkey and Pakistan have been conducting joint military exercises in the Aegean Sea. One such exercise was concluded in September; another is slated before the end of the year. Both countries possess certain standard military equipment, mostly supplied by the United States.

Washington has always been nursing a grouse against Islamabad for not having signed the non-proliferation treaty and refusing to allow inspection of its nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet it is unwilling to disown a friendly regime which owes its very continuance to the American aid it gets.

Washington also fears that a nuclear Pakistan will be also an unruly Pakistan. Already the Zia regime is not behaving the way Washington wants it to. In that case, how a nuclear Pakistan would behave is the American fear. But there is little that the United States can do for it is in its interest to prop up the pro-American regime in Islamabad against the Russians in Afghanistan. Zia knows this well and is playing his cards shrewdly. The American aid to Pakistan, presently cut off, is expected to sail through by January. Now who is the big brother? The United States or Pakistan?

/9604

## IRAN

### **Opposition Leaders Review Problems Facing Khomeyni Regime**

46040003 *London AL-MUSLIMUN in Arabic*  
26 Sep 87 p 3

[Article by Sharif Qandil: "The Wolves of Tehran Are Engaged in the Dance of Death"]

[Text] The scorpion man.

They gave their lives, their blood, and their youth for the sake of his arrival, and when he returned he started to spread his poisons, then turned on them to bite them. So it was not by chance that a week after his arrival, groups brimming over with weapons appeared calling themselves "the revolutionary guard" to hide their true face. They are the "advanced Savak" which inherited all the forms of barbarism from the overbearing intelligence agencies.

It was no coincidence that 1,200 persons were trained in a closed camp in less than 21 days, not to bear arms, regulate traffic, or stabilize security, but to become judges!

The best way to learn about Khomeyni's regime is for one to produce the statements of the pillars of this regime and cite them without comment!

However, this is the press — movement, contacts, meetings, then the heated desire of the pen and the readers' questions and searches for information. So the journey took place, and this report occurred.

Karim Musavi Ardabili, the senior judge of the Khomeyni regime, said, "This regime's objective is to create a society devoid of prisoners. Why? Because if we know God, we must not delay sending them to their paradise, without procrastination!"

Musavi Tabrizi, the regime's prosecutor general, said, "The people who are arrested are tried in the streets, and they must not be given a chance to stay in prison, eating and sleeping at the expense of the government budget.... The testimony of two Pasdaran (Khomeyni's guards) is enough not to delay their execution more than a night."

The members of the guard were at the same level of responsibility and understanding as their leaders. So, more than 50 human heads can be severed in a night.

"With respect to the people who are imprisoned for opposing the guards, it is permissible that they stand with their faces to the wall and be shot at once. According to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, there is no need for them to appear before the competent judiciary. Signed, Lajevardi, public prosecutor of the city of Tehran."

The whole world does not need testimony from Mas'ud Rajavi, the Iranian opposition figure, his wife Maryam, or his aides to know the crimes and atrocities of the Khomeyni regime against the world and against a specific part of it, Iran. When I tried to meet the Iranian opposition, the task seemed extremely difficult, with the result that I lost hope of meeting them. However, another call came after I had set down the receiver. Two of Rajavi's aides were waiting for me a few steps from where I was staying!

### Orders To Open Fire On Us

"Since you are Muslims, since you are with AL-MUSLIMUN and since we are Muslims, we sought to meet you just as you yourselves did, but there are activities and events which forced us to be late and forced Mas'ud Rajavi to send us to you. [Signed] Majid Taleqani [and] Hoseyn 'Abedini."

I told the officials of the Iranian resistance, "I see that you are young people, and it seems that you are outside the basic organization!" They burst out laughing and said, "Rajavi himself is 40. Do not forget that 60 percent of the Iranians are young people."

[Question] When did your dispute and clash with the regime begin?

[Answer] In September 1980, when the war began, we asserted that we were against any infringement of our territory and nation, and we took a position in which we declared the organization of the ranks of our fighting men to defend Iran if necessary. The Mojahedin took their positions, and fire and bullets rained down on us from behind. Orders had been issued to open fire on our men!

### The Four Pillars Have Been Broken

[Question] But you are now in Iraq.

[Answer] In the second half of 1982, the Iraqi government declared its readiness for peace and withdrew all its forces from the territory of Iran. The appeals for peace were repeated and the farce of the war and Khomeyni's desire for its continuation and his declaration of expansionist plans at the expense of all the Arabs became clear to us. Khomeyni's regime now depends on four pillars, which are oil, wheat, war, and terror.

Let us begin with the war, since that is the greatest catastrophe to befall Iran and world peace. This war has inflicted more than 1.5 million casualties and more than \$500 billion on Iran, in addition to other economic and social losses. As you know, millions of Iranians are now living as dispossessed persons and are suffering under the vilest of conditions. In addition, there are more than 2 million persons who have fled the war and have been able to flee from Iran. In addition, more than 50 cities, more than 3,000 villages and 12,000 factories have been destroyed.

### No Development Plan Exists

Majid Taleqani continued, "It is amazing that Khomeyni no longer finds a justification for the Iranian people to bear more of the accumulating burdens and economic problems. It has reached the point that when a great flood occurred in northern Iran to which hundreds of civilians fell victim because there were not the least technical preparations to cope with such floods, he came out openly declaring that the cause of the flood was the people, because they had not thanked God for his bounties.

"So far this regime has not taken any reform or development steps. Indeed, Khomeyni's guards during the flood in the midst of the citizens' screams inspected the water, engaged in pickpocketing and stole the gold, jewelry, and goods the citizens had lost. Some Iranian newspapers acknowledged these farces."

### Shutdown Of The Oil Refineries

Hoseyn 'Abedini moved on to the second factor on which Khomeyni's regime is founded—oil—and said: "Rafsanjani himself has admitted that the oil Iran is now getting has dropped by 400 percent. Behzad Nabavi, the minister of heavy industries, has also admitted that the



economic situation has collapsed because of the oil and made everything move out of our hands, and we don't know how things will carry us along next year."

'Abedini added, "The regime is now using just five oil refineries. They are actually working at half their capacity as a result of the permanent breakdowns. These are the refineries of Esfahan, Kermanshah, Tabriz, Tehran One, and Tehran Two. It appears that the Kermanshah refinery has now completely stopped working.

"Iran, as is well known, is situated on a sea of oil, and nonetheless many people are dying of cold in the winter. As for industry, Hoseyn Musavi, the prime minister, referred to this when he said that Iran is facing a deteriorating situation because of the war. It is enough for us to know that more than 12,000 factories have stopped working and that the remaining ones are working at half their capacity. In fact, many of them have changed course and started to produce weapons and bombs for use in the war. As a result of the shutdown of this tremendous number of factories, the number of unemployed persons in the industrial area alone has come to 6 million. They represent half the humans who are able to work in Iran.

### Drought Is Coming

"As for wheat, and agriculture in general, as the minister of agriculture has admitted, they are going through a situation that is as bad as can be. It is enough for us to know that the cultivated area in Iran, which in the period before Khomeyni was 76 million hectares, has shrunk to 14 million, as the Iranian papers have mentioned.

"Thus Iran in this manner is approaching a drought, and its ruling regime is approaching a disaster because of its lack of an important element, wheat."

Khomeyni's regime, as 'Abedini said, is giving birth to crises, not facing them. The level of taxes and prices has increased in a terrifying fashion. The price of a kilogram of meat, for example, was 1,000 Iranian rials and has gone up to 3,000 rials. The price of 20 liters of gasoline has gone up to 5,000 rials; before Khomeyni it was just 600 rials. The prices of electricity and gasoline have gone up by 850 percent in a year!

### The Other Side

The picture on the other side seems totally different. The pillars of the regime are living a life of plenty and the situation has reached the point, as Majid Taleqani said, where the chairman of the court of justice, Musavi Ardabili, directly administers the system for exporting narcotics to Europe. The Iranian opposition managed to reveal the documents on this operation and offered them to the Italian police, who placed preventive measures on Khomeyni's embassy in Rome, and so the notorious crisis with Italy occurred. Ahmad Khomeyni is also dealing with Iran's problems now, and exploiting them

materially in a manner known to most of the people of Iran, among whom the proportion of people loathing the regime has come to 90 percent. As for the remaining 10 percent, they include some of the mullahs and members of the revolutionary guard.

Majid Taleqani continued to talk about choosing Iraq as a base for the opposition and its preparations to return [to Iran]: "After Iraq had withdrawn its forces and declared its readiness for peace, the war lost its legitimate justification, and Mas'ud Rajavi came to meet with Tariq 'Aziz, the Iraqi deputy prime minister, at Rajavi's home in Paris. This was the first declared official meeting aimed at attaining a just peace, and in fact a declaration was issued at the end of their meeting which was the basis for the peace proposal which Iraq is calling for and adhering to. Rajavi spoke in his capacity as chairman of the national resistance council."

### This Is Our Council

[Question] What about this council?

[Answer] The council is composed of the parties, organizations, societies, and figures who are opposing what Khomeyni is doing. It now contains 13 organizations, including fighting and combat organizations which are carrying out resistance and combat activities inside Iran, representing the backbone of this council.

[Question] When was this council established?

[Answer] This council was established in 1981, that is, after 2 and a half years of repression and terror and the restriction of all freedoms had passed. It was established specifically after Khomeyni's guard had opened fire on the Iranian people!

[Question] How?

[Answer] Yes, we can say that if the Iranian-Iraqi war started in 1980, the Khomeyni-Iranian war started in 1981!

Khomeyni has become one of the Iranian people's basic enemies!

### All the People Are with Us

[Question] How have the Iranian people responded to you?

[Answer] On 20 June 1981, while Khomeyni ordered every voice demanding freedom to be silenced, a great march arranged by the organization took place in Tehran. This march was declared only 2 hours ahead of time. Nonetheless, more than 1 million citizens gathered in the streets of Tehran, and they increased to 3 million, in solidarity with the Mojahedin. At this point Khomeyni became concerned and ordered fire to be opened on the masses who had gone out to condemn his regime. The

decision to open fire on us was announced on the radio and television! Hundreds of thousands of casualties and arrested persons became the victims of this action.

### The Death Lists

Taleqani went on: "On the morning of the day following the parade, the papers published the pictures of 20 girls in the newspaper Ettela'at, and the authorities requested their relatives to identify them and show up to receive their corpses. All the people who came were fired on, without discrimination. This was the start of the blood-bath in Iran. After that, thousands were executed and thousands more disappeared under mysterious circumstances. Nonetheless, we managed to collect the names of the martyrs who fell at the hands of Khomeyni; some of us faced death to achieve that purpose, and in fact dozens of our young people fell. We will soon publish a new list aside from the ones we have published, since more than 2,000 Iranians have been executed in recent weeks.

"Amnesty International has referred more than once to the regime's crimes, which in their enormity have extended to the killing of pregnant mothers. We asked everyone who claims adherence to Islam in Khomeyni's regime, was a single child executed in the time of the prophet, on whom be prayers and peace? Was a pregnant woman executed in the time of him, on whom be God's prayers and peace? Khomeyni has executed hundreds of children and pregnant women on the argument that he is God's representative on earth!"

[Question] Are you content with just collecting names and publishing them in the cities of Europe?

[Answer] No, our resistance to the regime has arisen in the other Iranian villages and towns. And we established the National Liberation Army in January 1981, whose battalions since then have carried out more than 100 successful operations and have destroyed hundreds of bases and headquarters belonging to the guard. The regime was compelled to send 20 armored brigades and divisions after their withdrawal from the battlefield to confront the Liberation Army. Indeed, Khomeyni has ordered Rafsanjani himself to supervise and monitor the movements of the Liberation Army in cooperation with Gen Sa'di Hasani, commander of the infantry forces. We have managed to take 15 of the regime's senior personnel captive!

### The New Government

[Question] Have you finished forming your future government?

[Answer] We will finish that soon. However, we have propounded the new government's program. Heading this are distinctive relations with the Arab brothers and the pursuit of the policy of nonalignment. Rajavi has been nominated as president for a period of 6 months,

after which new elections will be held. In any event, there will not be another Khomeyni in the structure of the new government, but it will contain representatives of the clergymen, such as Jalal Ganji and Dr Matin-Daftari, Dr Mosaddeq's grandson. There are Ebrahim Mazandarani, representative of the merchants, Dr Hazarkhani, representative of the professors of the independent universities, and representatives of the military figures, athletes, and other groups of the people.

### We Reject Marxism

[Question] What about your relationship with the Tudeh party?

[Answer] We have no connection with it. In our view it is one of the parties which has committed treason against the Iranian people. In general, this party has not had any base among the people. It helped Khomeyni arrest and execute people from the organization of the People's Mojahedin. The Iranian opposition does not believe in Marxism, and we reject the attempts of Khomeyni's guard to distort our image. However, we are Muslims and our organizations are Islamic, and we are working to restore Islam to its proper image in Iran.

### The Great Scorpion

[Question] What about the post-Khomeyni stage and the struggles going on there?

[Answer] One of the catastrophes that is befalling our people now is the beginning of the division of the inheritance. However, we think that they are all barbarians. After the hijacking of the American TWA airplane, they said that Rafsanjani was a solid personality, then they turned around and said that he was a "moderate" figure. However, we think that they are wolves carrying out the dance of death, and they will remain in their jungle until one of them weakens. Then they will eat him and then another one will weaken and they will eat him, and so on. As for Khomeyni, he is the great scorpion! [Box, p 3]

### Our Girls Are Muslims, Not Followers of Khomeyni

Mrs Maryam Rajavi is the wife of the chairman of the Iranian National Council, Mas'ud Rajavi. Maryam has spent 15 years in continuous struggle.

Maryam Rajavi said that 35 percent of the members of the organization and the council are Iranian women, Muslims, not followers of Khomeyni.

She added, "Our organization is a Muslim one. It has an Islamic ideology which is totally in opposition to adherence to Khomeyni. Our girls wear the veil, are not licentious, and do not commit violations against religion, but they commit violations against Khomeyni and his vile ideas." Maryam, whose brother was executed at



the hands of the Shah and whose sister was executed while pregnant at Khomeyni's hands, asserted that the Iranian resistance's activity is beginning to escalate and will continue until the end of Khomeyni and his regime, which are hanging over the necks of the Iranian people. [Box, p 3]

### **The Proof of Khomeyni's Terrorism: The Names behind 137 Methods of Torture**

The Iranian opposition figure Hoseyn 'Abedini referred to the methods of torture the Khomeyni regime uses and said, "They are 137 methods in all. A report has been published from inside Tehran listing 64 of the torture methods used and it is on the way to publishing another report listing another 73 methods."

He added, "These methods were not used even in the Middle Ages. Perhaps the most notorious of them are the withdrawal of the prisoners' blood every day until their death, the burning of prisoners just by cigarettes, the breaking of the bones of the hand and the vertebrae, the removal of prisoners' eyes and their use in the treatment of eyes of guard members who face resistance and beatings if they go out alone, cooking on grills as one would barbecue chicken, removal of the prisoner's genitalia, electric shocks, and the raping of girls by more than one person!"

"There is the method of the 'cage,' where the prisoner is locked up after having his hands tied behind his back in a cage the size of his body while he is squatting. After a few days the prisoner is afflicted with paralysis, then he meets his death. In addition, some prisoners have been hung on a steel frame, then pulled from both sides until they are totally split apart. In addition, blows are directed at sensitive parts of the body. One of the sisters was subjected to this vile crime!"

### **Sadeq Khalkhali**

He is someone close to Khomeyni, was given the title of ayatollah and received broad notoriety in Iran and outside when he assumed the position of chairman of the Iranian revolutionary courts and issued arbitrary death sentences against the former leaders of Iran and men of the opposition. Khalkhali assumed the position of the chairman of the anti-narcotics committee in Iran, then was compelled to resign on 30 November 1980 after he was accused of trafficking in narcotics and extortion!

### **Ahmad Khomeyni**

Khomeyni's son, born in 1943. His father appointed him an advisor on religious affairs in 1977, as successor to his brother Mostafa. He has been given the title of ayatollah, and it has been said that he was responsible for the explosion at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party in Tehran on 29 June 1981 which killed 74

persons. He is preparing himself for the succession of his father in spite of scandals concerning money smuggled to banks of Europe under his jurisdiction and to his account.

### **Mohammad Hoseyn Beheshti, the "Rasputin of Iran"**

His date of birth is not known. It is said that he was 52 the day he was killed, on 29 June 1981. Beheshti was Iran's iron man and preferred to manipulate events without appearing on the scene of the events. It has been said that the decision to isolate Bani Sadr, which Khomeyni declared on 23 June 1981, was in reality a decision of his doing. He was distinguished for coldness and sagacity and was called "the Rasputin of Iran." Beheshti was killed when the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party were blown up.

### **Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani**

He is the closest of those near Khomeyni, and has the title of ayatollah. He was a member of the organization of the People's Mojahedin, then rebelled against it. Rafsanjani was subjected to an assassination attempt when two people entered his home on 26 June 1979 and fired at him. He sustained a serious wound. The Forqan group declared its responsibility for the incident. He assumed chairmanship of the consultative council (parliament) and is a member of the supreme defense council. When Bani Sadr was removed from the presidency, he was appointed to the trilateral presidential council (Rafsanjani, Raja'i and Beheshti).

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### **Export-Import Regulation Changes Announced**

46400013a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
14 Sep 87 p 2

[Text] Economic Service—Yesterday morning Mr Sane'i'pur, chief of Iran Customs, met with the various departments of the Intelligence Institute, and in each department he was given explanations by the appropriate officials.

The chief of Iran Customs then talked with our correspondent, announcing changes in the export-import guidelines recently approved by the Council of Ministers. He also discussed the state of the nation's non-petroleum exports in the first five months of the current year [21 March-22 August 1987].

He began by noting that the export-import guidelines were given to Iran Customs on 21 Shahrivar [12 September]. He said: This set of guidelines includes many changes from previous ones, especially in one of its most important areas, the portions pertaining to foreign exchange.

He added: In these guidelines the rates for free-floating foreign exchange are to be lowered, and while greater control is to be exercised over export foreign exchange, free-floating foreign exchange is also to be regulated in order to prevent increases in the rate for foreign exchange.

The Chief of Iran Customs then said: Another point in the guidelines is that foreign exchange notes will be regarded as securities. These foreign exchange notes will be given primacy and their price will be regulated.

He then discussed the antiinflationary policy that governs the guidelines. He said: The adoption of an antiinflationary policy means that the volume of currency in circulation must be reduced, and that monetary policy must be designed to prevent inflation and price increases. In general a relationship must be established between the nation's economy and foreign markets so that these two parameters will not move independently of one another.

He added: The antiinflationary policy governing the regulations and the import-export guidelines may also create difficulties in practice, but these decisions have been taken following this same general direction taken by import-export regulations to reduce the value of the dollar and establish a stable price for goods.

Giving the most important characteristics of these guidelines, Mr Sane'i'pur mentioned the creation of limitations on foreign exchange for traveling or importing goods without transferring foreign exchange, the creation of limitations on goods imported in exchange for exports, and especially the establishment of a list in this regard.

Mr Sane'i'pur then said: The new guidelines for import-export regulations contain major changes concerning border cooperatives, the importation of goods in exchange for exports, goods without transferring foreign exchange, regulations on gifts and souvenirs, and many other matters, the details of which will be announced soon.

### First Five Months' Non-Petroleum Export Statistics

Mr Sane'i'pur then discussed non-petroleum export statistics for the first five months of the current year.

He said: In the first five months of 1366 [21 March-22 August 1987] 440,000 tons of non-petroleum goods valued at 30,624 million rials (\$410 million) were placed in the markets of the world, unprecedented in both weight and value compared to the same period in any of the previous 15 years. Compared to the same period last year these figures show a 96.3 percent increase in weight and a 28.3 percent increase in value.

He added: Among export items, 21.44 percent of the total in weight is fresh fruits, at 94,000 tons; carpets make up 37.16 percent of their value, at a total of 11,383 million rials.

Mr Sane'i'pur said: Exports of hand-woven wool carpets in the first five months of the current year, thanks to the efforts and support of workers in Islamic Republic of Iran Customs, amounted to about 3.9 thousand tons valued at 11,383 million rials. Of these, 80 percent were exported through Mehrabad and south Tehran customs, and this represents about a 73 percent increase in weight and a 42.79 percent increase in value over the same period last year.

He added: During this period dried fruit exports weighed 43,000 tons and were valued at 6,838 million rials, 9.59 percent of all exports by weight and 22.31 percent of their value. Most of these were pistachios in the shell and pistachio nuts weighing 23,000 tons and valued at 5,851 million rials, 99 percent of which were exported through Kerman customs.

He added: Pistachio exports increased 252.3 percent by weight over the same period last year and 166.74 percent in value. Exports of currants and green raisins weighed 16.6 thousand tons and were valued at 703 million rials, a 136.7 percent increase over the same period last year by weight and an 86.9 percent increase in value. Exports of dried apricots and other dried fruits weighed about 1.9 thousand tons and were valued at 156 million rials.

Mr Sane'i'pur then said: In the first five months of 1366 about 2.4 thousand tons of medicinal and industrial goods valued at 283 million rials were exported, including licorice and licorice extract.

The Chief of Iran Customs said that fresh frozen and smoked fish and fresh and salted shrimp weighing 75 tons and valued at 296 million rials were among the ocean fish exported in the period mentioned. He added: Tripe, hides and their products were exported weighing 6.8 thousand rials and valued at 33.28 million rials, a decrease of about 15 percent in weight and an increase of 44.37 percent in value.

He added: The nation's export items also included mineral and iron ores weighing 75.8 thousand tons and valued at 1,714 million rials. These include copper weighing 8.6 thousand tons and valued at 814 million rials, as well as lead ore and chromite. Each of these items increased 100 percent in both weight and value over the same period last year.

He said: Knitted goods and cotton and woolen fabrics weighing 518 tons and valued at 399 million rials were exported. Over the same period last year, knitted goods increased 650 percent by weight and 737.96 percent in value. Each of the other goods mentioned also increased 100 percent. Chemical goods weighing 1,352 tons and

valued at 1,718 thousand rials were also exported; about 122 tons of that was sulphur, valued at 916 million rials and representing a 100 percent increase.

Mr Sane'ipur then discussed the nation's other export items. He said: About 181 tons of coolers, gas lamps and electrical parts and appliances valued at 17,250 thousand rials were also exported, and each one of them increased 100 percent over the same period last year.

He added: In Mordad of 1366 [23 July-22 August 1987] about 92,000 tons of goods valued at 7,960 million rials were exported, and in comparison with Mordad of 1365 this represents about a 194 percent increase in weight and a 91 percent increase in value. In terms of weight, the bulk of these items were fresh fruits, amounting to about 34.26 percent of all exports. The most expensive export items were carpets, making up 57.41 percent of the value of all exports in this period.

### Changes in Emblem of Iran Customs

In another portion of his remarks the chief of customs discussed changes in the emblem of Iran Customs.

He said: The new Iran Customs emblem has four colors. It has a gold background with the emblem of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the form of a flag. The emblem has a likeness of the globe in the shape of a circle, with the emblem of the Islamic Republic of Iran appearing as the eye of the circle.

He added: On this emblem, the name Iran Customs has been changed to Islamic Republic of Iran Customs.

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### Goods Purchased from Dubayy Amount to 120 Million Dollars

46400010a London KEYHAN in Persian 24 Sep 87 p 8

[Text] In the first quarter of 1987 Dubayy exported the equivalent of \$118 million in goods to the Islamic Republic. Goods exported from Dubayy's free port to the Islamic republic are imported to Dubayy from the industrial nations of the West and the Far East. From the declared free port of Dubayy, where customs duties are not levied against imported goods, goods are purchased by other nations of the Persian Gulf basin, especially the Islamic Republic.

The market for reexporting from Dubayy's free port to the Islamic Republic is so good that this port's merchants have announced that if the Iran-Iraq war ends and the Iranians acquire an abundance of financial resources, all the goods in this port will be purchased in a very few days by Iranian customers.

Based on reports from Dubayy, while the Islamic republic purchased a total of \$100 million in goods from Dubayy's free port in 1986, the value of Iran's imports

from this port in the first quarter of 1987 alone has come to about \$120 million. Economic experts predict that if the economic exchanges between Tehran and Dubayy continue to increase at the same rate, the Islamic republic will have purchased more than \$1.5 billion in goods from this free port by the end of the current year. These experts add that the official figures published by Dubayy's commercial sources do not include merchandise and goods which are smuggled out of this port. In addition, every day large quantities of weapons, munitions and spare parts for war equipment are exported from this port to the Islamic republic, the value of which is also not reflected in official customs figures and statistics.

### Twenty Flights Between Islamic Republic and Dubayy

Andrew Whitley, a reporter for the Financial Times of London, published a detailed article in that newspaper titled 'Iran's Vital Artery in a Hostile Sea'.

He wrote: Last week there were more than 20 flights from the free port of Dubayy to the Islamic republic.

Among these flights, the National Iranian Air Line also makes daily flights between Tehran, Dubayy, and Bandar 'Abbas. Despite the number of flights and the existence of numerous sea lanes between this port and the many ports on the shores of the Persian Gulf, the number of passengers is still so great that it is difficult to obtain airline seating and tickets must be obtained well in advance. According to an employee of the Dubayy Travel Agency, flights to Tehran are full for the next two months.

Most of the merchandise exported from the free port of Dubayy to the Islamic republic consists of consumer goods, industrial and electronic implements, and goods used in the home. These goods include radios, televisions, auto parts, coolers, electric sweepers, video cassette recorders, video tapes, washing machines, electric refrigerators, and other similar items. An economic expert said: Since the time the Islamic republic was established in Iran and that country has according to appearances turned its back on the Western industrial nations, the free port of Dubayy and more or less Sharjah have become a window connecting domestic Iranian markets to the West's industrial products and consumer goods. The merchants of Dubayy, most of whom are of Iranian extraction, may procure and ship to Iran various goods which are not easy to obtain in Iran or which are available only in limited supply or at high cost.

Iranian customers may even obtain sugar, tea, rice or automobile tires in Dubayy and take them to Iran. Andrew Whitley, in another portion of his report, wrote: The Islamic republic regards the two wealthiest of the seven United Arab Emirates as politically neutral and has therefore profited from them in various political and economic ways.

Politically and economically, Dubayy and Sharijah in the crisis-ridden waters of the Persian Gulf have come to resemble Switzerland during World War II. Since the war began between the Islamic republic and Iraq, Dubayy and Sharijah have become centers of congregation for international spies as well as of the activities of large smuggling networks in the area.

### **Smuggling Iranian Caviar and Hand-Woven Carpets**

In addition to purchasing large quantities of merchandise from the free port of Dubayy, the Islamic republic exports fresh fruits and vegetables to this port. From there these fruits are exported to the Arab nations of the Persian Gulf. Last March alone the Islamic republic exported cargos of fruit to this port valued at 13 million dollars. Most of these fruits are exported to Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and several other nations in the area. Even so, the Islamic republic's exports to the free port of Dubayy has not been limited to the merchandise and goods mentioned above. Many smugglers import considerable quantities of caviar and hand-woven Iranian carpets to this port daily. Smugglers endure many hardships to bring their goods to the free port of Dubayy. These people apparently bring their goods and their cargos by camel along the edge of the great salt plain in Iran to Baluchestan. From there they take them in small fishing boats in the dead of night to small abandoned

islands in the Persian Gulf. Finally, when suitable opportunities arise, they take their goods to the aforementioned free port. After selling their goods at the free port, these smugglers return to Iran with other smuggled goods such as whiskey, American cigarettes, and video cassette recorders. The Financial Times newspaper wrote: The National Iranian Oil Company has an office in Sharijah. This office also has the responsibility of buying industrial goods for the Islamic republic. Even so, like the National Iranian Oil Company's office in London, this office also buys weapons and spare parts for war equipment and ships them to Iran. Weapons which are transferred to this port after purchase may be sent to Iranian ports easily and without obstruction. Apparently due to economic interests and commercial considerations, Sheykh Rashed, the ruler of Dubayy, and the officials of the Islamic republic, do not react to the illegal activities that take place in this port. Dubay and the United Arab Emirates in general have more or less retained their neutral position on the war between the Islamic republic and Iraq. Quoting Bahman Na'imi Arfa', charge d'affaires of the Islamic republic's embassy in Dubayy, the Financial Times wrote: Relations between the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic republic are a model we have recommended to other nations for their emulation.

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